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THE ANONYMOUS INTERNET 
BRYAN H. CHOI∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article argues in favor of regulating online anonymity, not 
from the standpoint that doing so will prevent harmful abuses or 
improve security, but instead that refusing to do so will ultimately 
harm other liberty interests.  One principle that has emerged from 
cyberlaw scholarship is that we should safeguard the Internet’s “gen-
erativity”—a key attribute representing the latitude and plasticity 
with which a technology (like the Internet) can be adapted to perform 
new, unanticipated uses—because generativity is the root source of 
the Internet’s unique vitality.  Yet, if we want regulators to leave 
generativity alone, we must offer them another point of leverage with 
which to regulate abusive behavior.  It is not enough to recommend 
simply that regulators should exercise restraint to minimize loss to 
generative potential. 
 The descriptive claim here is that the desire to regulate the Internet 
can manifest itself either as restrictions on anonymity or as re-
strictions on generativity, and that one can be traded for the other.  
The normative claim that follows is that we should favor the genera-
tive Internet over the anonymous Internet for at least two reasons.  
First, generativity is the engine that ignites the Internet’s most essen-
tial and electrifying function, as a platform that perpetuates techno-
logical innovation and output.  Second, restrictions on generativity 
impose restraints further upstream and are therefore more troubling 
than restrictions on anonymity.  Third, anonymity is a value held 
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in only modest esteem—the so-called constitutional “right to ano-
nymity” is a narrow protection that does not contemplate the unbri-
dled use of anonymizing technologies.  Thus, where regulatory goals 
are being pursued, we should encourage Internet regulators to look to 
limitations on anonymity as a means of averting more onerous limi-
tations on generativity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has made anonymity seem like an entitlement.  We 
have become accustomed to assuming that we are hidden in obscurity 
within the confines of our computer screen.  The early days of “sign-
ing online”—literally, signing one’s account number or screenname 
as authorization to access a networked line—have been succeeded by 
always-on broadband that never prompts for any personal login in-
formation.1  We are not asked for identification when we browse most 
websites and, when we are, we select monikers that are fanciful and 
disposable.2  If real identity is required, such as to check one’s bank 
                                               
 1.  See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 32 
(2008) (noting that CompuServe and AOL were “built to identify the people using [the 
network],” whereas today, “[u]ser identification is left to individual Internet users and 
servers to sort out if they wish to demand credentials of some kind from those with whom 
they communicate”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Richard Siklos, A Virtual World but Real Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at 
C1 (reporting that on Second Life, “an online service . . . that allows computer users to 
create a new and improved digital version of themselves,” most of the users “have chosen 
their names from a whimsical menu of supplied surnames, resulting in monikers like 
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account balance, it is always requested separately, further bolstering 
the illusion that authenticated realms are distinct islands that are vis-
ited only at the prerogative of the user.3 
The activities of groups like Anonymous, LulzSec, and WikiLeaks, 
as well as the uses of Internet-based organizing during the recent Ar-
ab Spring revolutions, have enhanced the romanticism and notoriety 
of anonymity.4  The idea that anonymity can provide a check on abu-
sive power is deeply appealing.  Yet, anonymity can be abused in 
turn;5 those who criticize anonymity argue that it breeds its own form 
of unaccountability.6  Asking whether anonymity is good or bad is the 
wrong question, because our instincts change depending on whose 
anonymity is at issue.  We know that some anonymity must be pre-
served, yet we worry that the Internet currently offers too much ano-
nymity.  We also know that anonymity is a fragile construct, and so we 
fear that altering the balance might compromise too much.  The re-
sulting reluctance to confront anonymity on its face has led to seem-
ing paralysis in the near term.  In the longer term, that hesitation will 
squeeze out the real value of the Internet. 
While anonymity has been a longstanding attribute of the Inter-
net, this Article will argue that preserving it will increasingly come at 
the expense of another attribute that is arguably more essential to the 
Internet’s exceptionalism.  In a set of recent publications, Jonathan 
Zittrain has posited that the key to the Internet’s success is “generativ-
ity,” a quality he defines as “a system’s capacity to produce unanticipated 
change through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied audiences.”7  
                                               
Snoopybrown Zamboni and Bitmason Pimpernel”).  But see Catherine Greenman, On the 
Net, Curiosity Has a Price: Registration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at G8 (“N[o] matter where 
you go on the Internet these days, it seems you won’t get very far without first registering, 
signing in or becoming a ‘member,’ all of which require that you provide your name, your 
e-mail address and other personal information.”). 
 3.  Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 32–33 (“[A] particular Web site might demand that a 
user create an ID and password in order to gain access to its contents[, but b]ecause the 
user does not have to log in [to the Internet] the way he or she would to use a proprietary 
service, identity is obscured.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Quinn Norton, 2011: The Year Anonymous Took on Cops, Dictators and Exis-
tential Dread, WIRED (Jan. 11, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01 
/anonymous-dicators-existential-dread/all/. 
 5.  See infra Parts II–III.A. 
 6.  See infra Part III.A. 
 7.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 70; see id. at 101 (“[T]he generative nature of the PC 
and Internet . . . is both the cause of their success and the instrument of their forthcoming 
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In other words, generativity is the essential ingredient of innovation, 
representing the freedom to tinker and to transform a technology far 
beyond its originally intended uses.8 
Generative technologies do not know what they want to be when 
they grow up.  As an analog, paper is highly generative because it can 
be adapted to accomplish any number of tasks, such as writing, wrap-
ping fish, flying kites, storing gunpowder, and so on.9  The set of pos-
sible uses for paper is diverse and expanding, not fixed upon fabrica-
tion.  Not all technologies are endowed with equal generative 
potential.10  For example, LEGO blocks are a more generative tool 
than jigsaw puzzle pieces, because LEGO blocks are more open-ended 
and allow for more variations and permutations.  Smartphones are 
more generative than landline phones.  The potency of the Internet, 
and of digital computing more generally, is that it has been one of the 
most generative technologies we have ever encountered.11 
But by the same token, that versatility is a double-edged sword: 
generativity enables abuses that threaten, and occasionally effectuate, 
disastrous disruptions on personal, national, and global scales.  Paper 
can be used to libel someone’s good name, set a forest fire, or start a 
war.  The more generative a technology is, the more dangerous it can 
be.  By definition, the abuses of generativity cannot be separated from 
the benefits; the freedom to experiment required to produce good 
                                               
failure.”); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1980 (2006) 
(“Generativity denotes a technology’s overall capacity to produce unprompted change 
driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences.”); see also James Grimmelmann & 
Paul Ohm, Dr. Generative or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the iPhone, 69 MD. L. 
REV. 910, 924 (2010) (book review) (“[Zittrain’s] work on generativity is a milestone in 
Internet law scholarship.  It’s the best descriptive and normative theory to date on what 
makes the Internet special.”); David G. Post, The Theory of Generativity, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2755, 2756 (2010) [hereinafter Post, The Theory of Generativity]. 
 8.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 71–73 (describing “five principal factors” that 
“make[] something generative,” including leverage, adaptability, ease of mastery, accessi-
bility, and transferability); Zittrain, supra note 7, at 1981–82 (“[G]enerativity increases with 
the ability of users to generate new, valuable uses that are easy to distribute and are in turn 
sources of further innovation.”). 
 9.  Zittrain, The Generative Internet, supra note 7, at 1981. 
 10.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 75–76 (listing many examples of generative tools and 
their less generative counterparts). 
 11.  See Zittrain, The Generative Internet, supra note 7, at 1982–94 (“It is difficult to iden-
tify . . . a technology bundle more generative than the PC and the Internet to which it at-
taches.”). 
  
2013] THE ANONYMOUS INTERNET 505 
outcomes necessarily allows bad ones too.12  The unusually broad 
range of uses enabled by the Internet means that the Internet also 
poses an unusually broad range of potential abuses.13 
Zittrain warns that generativity is not an immutable feature of the 
Internet, and that we could too easily surrender the best aspects of 
the Internet in response to our worst fears.14  He acknowledges the 
need for compromise, but worries that the antidote will be too 
strong.15  To avoid a future in which the Internet is locked down, 
Zittrain advances a “generativity principle,” which asks that “any mod-
ifications to the Internet’s design . . . be made where they will do the 
least harm to generative possibilities.”16 
Zittrain’s conclusion is sound, but he glosses over a crucial step: 
how to determine least harm.  After all, if generativity is the very en-
gine that enables the abuses to be remedied, then leaving that gener-
ativity intact will continue to permit those same abuses.  One response 
in the literature has been that we need some way to measure genera-
tivity, to distinguish between those incarnations that are more valua-
ble and those that are expendable.17  The point is valid, but measur-
ing the erosion of generative potential will not prevent it.  As long as 
generativity is our only bargaining chip, each new harm will call for a 
one-way ratcheting of incremental restrictions on generativity.  What 
                                               
 12.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 96–97 (“[T]he Internet’s very generativity . . . sows 
the seeds for a ‘digital Pearl Harbor.’”); Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note 7, at 917 (“The 
problem is that not all innovation is to the good; swamps are fecund places too.”); see also 
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“But with freedom come conse-
quences.  Many of the same characteristics which make cyberspace ideal for First Amend-
ment expression . . . make it a potentially harmful media for children.”). 
 13.  See infra Part III.B. 
 14.  See generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 149–99 (“[T]he Internet’s generative char-
acteristics primed it for extraordinary success—and now position it for failure.  The re-
sponse to the failure will most likely be sterile tethered appliances and Web services that 
are contingently generative, if generative at all.”). 
 15.  See id. at 150 (“We need a strategy that blunts the worst aspects of today’s popular 
generative Internet and PC without killing these platforms’ openness to innovation.”). 
 16.  Id. at 165. 
 17.  See Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note 7, at 932, 934 (“When we predict the likely 
consequences of a given intervention, we need to be able to say whether it will nourish 
generativity or suffocate it.  We need, in other words, a good way to measure generativi-
ty. . . .  Zittrain also isn’t clear on when and how to sacrifice some generativity for the 
greater good.”). 
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we need instead is another point of leverage that can relieve the regu-
latory pressure on generativity.18 
This Article will argue that anonymity is that alternate lever.  
While generativity creates the capacity for abuse, anonymity allows it 
to be committed with impunity.  A choice to allow both generativity 
and anonymity is an implicit decision not to regulate at all.19  Yet, if we 
accept that some regulation is necessary, then preserving generativity 
requires a reduction in anonymity and, conversely, preserving ano-
nymity requires a reduction in generativity.  Thus, the fate of the gen-
erative Internet is inversely linked to how vigorously we choose to de-
fend the anonymous Internet.  Those who think generativity is the 
most important attribute of the Internet should be prepared to cede 
some anonymity.  As long as anonymity remains inviolate, generativity 
will be the loser.  That choice should be seen not as sacrificing liberty 
for security, but as prioritizing one liberty over another. 
Part II of this Article will explore the relationship between ano-
nymity and generativity by reframing a familiar set of cyberlaw prob-
lems and the regulatory approaches taken therein.  Under that clarify-
ing lens, it will become apparent that the regulatory responses have 
revolved around a central, implicit choice to restrict either anonymity 
or generativity.  Exposing that dichotomy will be useful in formulating 
a more principled approach for modeling future Internet regulations. 
Part III will step back to compare the theoretical underpinnings 
of anonymity and generativity, and to expand on the proposition that 
one might be exchanged for the other for purposes of regulation.  It 
is easy to see the harmonies between anonymity and generativity.  
Both are liberty values that confer freedom of choice over when and 
how to use our identities or our technologies, thereby maximizing our 
capacity to produce change through decentralized action.  Anonymity 
and generativity represent bottom-up mechanisms for disrupting the 
prevailing status quo by permitting new or alternative ideas to perco-
                                               
 18.  Cf. id. at 937–39 (pointing out that “[g]enerativity is an important value in Inter-
net law, but only one of many”). 
 19.  There are, of course, those who would celebrate an unregulated Internet.  See, e.g., 
LulzSec—100th Tweet, Statement (June 17, 2011), http://pastebin.com/HZtH523f (“This is 
the lulz lizard era, where we do things just because we find it entertaining. . . .  People who 
can make things work better within this rectangle have power over others . . . .  This is the 
Internet, where we screw each other over for a jolt of satisfaction.”); see also H. Brian Hol-
land, In Defense of Online Intermediary Liability: Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptional-
ism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 377–78 (2008) (summarizing the cyberlibertarianism move-
ment). 
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late up from any arbitrary source, be received on a level plane, and 
win acceptance on their merits.  Thus, the conventional wisdom is 
that anonymity and generativity go hand in hand, and that restricting 
one value also harms the other.  What is often overlooked are the ten-
sions between the two values and how we ought to prioritize if forced 
to pick. 
One reason to favor generativity is that it carries a higher oppor-
tunity cost—at least when it comes to the Internet.  The Internet of-
fers an exceedingly rare breed of generativity, and we have not yet 
seen all that it can do.  Even the ability to communicate anonymously 
online is an outgrowth of the Internet’s vitality, not the primary 
source.  Unless we were convinced that anonymous speech is the 
“killer app,”20 locking ourselves into a static Internet would be the 
larger loss. 
A second reason is that acting against generativity creates broad-
er concerns of prior restraint.  On one hand, restrictions on anonymi-
ty can impose a chilling effect, but each individual retains leeway to 
make that calculation of risk, even if it is an unpleasant one.  Remov-
ing generative capacity, on the other hand, quashes the very ability to 
challenge a rule, often without any real opportunity to invoke the le-
gal process. 
A third argument, to be developed in future work, is that ano-
nymity is a value traditionally held in weak esteem.  Contrary to what 
many liberal scholars have suggested, the jurisprudence of offline an-
onymity points to a rejection of any fundamental “right” to anonymi-
ty, limited or otherwise.  The relatively disfavored status of offline an-
onymity diminishes the view of online anonymity as sacrosanct, and 
lends further weight to the idea that the anonymous Internet should 
be reined in to safeguard the generative Internet. 
Finally, Part IV will conclude by examining the channels and 
challenges of building attribution into the Internet.  In the end, some 
generative compromise may be inevitable.  But if we are committed to 
maximizing generativity, then we must at least re-examine our com-
mitment to online anonymity.  A certain degree of anonymity may be 
inviolate.  Yet, if generativity represents the core value of the Internet, 
then sacrificing anonymity may be the lesser evil. 
                                               
 20   “The phrase ‘killer app’ is short for ‘killer application’ and refers to the form of 
content that makes a new technology desirable to a critical mass of consumers.”  Chad 
Woodford, Comment, Trusted Computing or Big Brother?  Putting the Rights Back in Digital 
Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 253, 271 (2004). 
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II.  FREE AS IN GENERATIVITY, NOT AS IN ANONYMITY 
Revisiting a few familiar cyberlaw problems will help set the stage 
and illustrate the basic tension between anonymity and generativity.  
The four examples selected here are copyright infringement, adult 
content, spam, and defamation, but others could easily be substituted.  
While each conflict has its own idiosyncrasies, the commonality is that 
every effort at resolution has turned on limiting either anonymity or 
generativity. 
One noteworthy theme has been the consistent reluctance of 
courts to allow expansive encroachments on online anonymity.21  Re-
strictions of online anonymity are characterized as a nuclear option 
with far-reaching repercussions, while restrictions of online generativ-
ity are often seen as a localized solution with contained impact.  Per-
haps the scales have been tipped by the fact that “anonymity” is a fa-
miliar concept that judges understand how to grapple with, whereas 
“generativity” has not yet achieved such salience and is still regarded 
as largely the province of technology rather than law.  The threat to 
generativity can be difficult to apprehend if generativity is viewed as a 
diffuse, intangible quality that is accessible to all inventors and tinker-
ers at large, but unclaimable by any one in particular until after it has 
ripened into a concrete, derivative technology.22 
Exposing on a systemic level the implicit choices being made be-
tween anonymity and generativity will sharpen the policy discussion 
going forward.  As a general rule, we do not insist on perfect genera-
tivity, because it would take too much surveillance and police power 
to offset the potential destructiveness.23  For the same reason, we 
should be wary of eroding too much generativity for the sake of per-
fect anonymity. 
A.  File Sharing and Copyright Infringement 
The music industry’s fight to enforce its copyrights against digital 
file sharing offers a useful starting point because the campaign fea-
tured a stark shift from efforts targeting generativity to efforts target-
                                               
 21. See, e.g., infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 22.  The difficulty in representing a claim of anti-generative harm might be compara-
ble to the difficulty in representing a claim of anticommons harm.  Cf. Michael A. Heller, 
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621 (1998). 
 23.  Cf. Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note 7, at 912 (“[G]enerativity is essential but can 
never be absolute. . . .  Tradeoffs are inevitable.”). 
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ing anonymity.  Although the strategy was heavily criticized at the 
time, the intuition was sound: If generativity and anonymity are regu-
latory substitutes, then one can choose to assert control over the 
technologies that enable abuse or over the individuals who commit it.  
All else equal, if the goal of enforcing the music industry’s copyrights 
is held constant, the question is whether to confront those who create 
illegitimate copies, or whether to remove the means by which such 
copies can be created.24  A choice to do neither is a constructive for-
feiture of the entitlement.25 
Early regulatory efforts focused on quashing the generative flood 
of peer-to-peer platforms that were rushing to solve the technological 
challenges of digital file sharing.26  Representatives of the music in-
dustry, including the now-notorious Recording Industry Association 
of America (“RIAA”), sought to suppress the technology by suing the 
developers and operators of all the major file-sharing networks.  In a 
series of high-profile lawsuits, the music industry achieved favorable 
results against entities such as MP3.com, Napster, Aimster, AudioGal-
axy, Kazaa, Morpheus, Grokster, iMesh, Limewire, and The Pirate 
Bay.27  At the same time, the music industry also pursued technologi-
                                               
 24.  See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1373–78 (2004) (“Copyright owners 
have understandably cast about for an alternative to suing end users.  The strategy they 
have settled on is to sue facilitators.  Suing facilitators is cost-effective for the content in-
dustries because a single lawsuit can eliminate the dissemination mechanism for a large 
number of end-user copies.”). 
 25.  Some have argued that there is a third way: reducing the incidence of abuse by 
cultivating better behavior, through devices such as default settings, community norms, or 
educational outreach.  Voluntary compliance is wonderful when it works, but relying on it 
as the sole recourse turns a copyright holding into a donation request, not a legal entitle-
ment.  For a longer discussion, see infra notes 200–212. 
 26.  See Lemley & Reese, supra note 24, at 1353–72 (describing expansions in applica-
tion of secondary liability and vicarious infringement theories, as well as reductions in safe 
harbors, as a “seismic shift in copyright infringement in the digital environment, away 
from suing direct infringers and towards suing facilitators with less and less connection to 
the act of copyright infringement”).  
 27.  See id. at 1349 (“So far, the courts have been largely willing to go along, shutting 
down a number of innovative services in the digital music realm.”); see generally Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919–21, 941 (2005); In re Aim-
ster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. 
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cal measures to cripple file sharing, such as flooding peer-to-peer 
networks with fake files28 and creating digital rights management 
(“DRM”) systems that used encryption to prevent unauthorized ac-
cess.29 
Those tactics enjoyed some success, but with diminishing re-
turns.30  The legal attacks strained the limits of copyright protection,31 
as well as those of international jurisdiction.32  The technological at-
                                               
Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 28.  See RUBEN CUEVAS ET AL., IS CONTENT PUBLISHING IN BITTORRENT ALTRUISTIC OR 
PROFIT-DRIVEN 5 (ACM CoNEXT 2010), available at http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-
next/2010/CoNEXT_papers/11-Cuevas.pdf (“Surprisingly, fake publishers are responsible 
for around . . . 30% of the published content and 25% of the downloads in [The Pirate 
Bay data set] . . . [which] suggests that major BitTorrent portals are suffering from a sys-
tematic poisoning index attack.”); Doug Lichtman & David Jacobson, Anonymity a Double-
Edged Sword for Pirates Online, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2000, at N25. 
 29.  See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 50 (2006) (“Distributors of copyrighted digital works may deploy 
‘digital rights management’ (‘DRM’) mechanisms that allow only certain types of access to, 
or uses of, the underlying copyrighted work and forbid all others.”); Alfred C. Yen, What 
Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA’s Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. 
REV. 649, 677–79 (2003) (objecting that “DRM gives copyright holders an unprecedented 
degree of control over their works,” which “could change copyright’s balance” by allowing 
copyright holders to charge for non-infringing uses that should be free). 
 30.  See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 29, at 50–51 (“[T]echnologically sophisticated us-
ers may be able to bypass a DRM mechanism and obtain greater access to the work than 
the DRM mechanism is intended to permit . . . .”); Nick Bilton, Internet Pirates Will Always 
Win, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, at SR5. 
 31.  See Bryan H. Choi, Note, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 399 
(2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Grokster “suggests that we are reach-
ing the limit as to how far secondary liability doctrine can be stretched to cover file-sharing 
technologies”); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 24, at 1349–50, 1379–90 (“The key poli-
cy point is that going after makers of technology for the uses to which their technologies 
may be put threatens to stifle innovation. . . .  The fundamental difficulty is that while 
courts can make decisions about direct infringement on a case-by-case basis, lawsuits based 
on indirect liability sweep together both socially beneficial and socially harmful uses of a 
program or service, either permitting both uses or condemning both.”).  
 32.  See John Tagliabue, In Sweden, Taking File Sharing to Heart.  And to Church., N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A8 (describing the growth of Europe’s Pirate Party, which has 
spread to “at least nine European countries” over the last decade); Ben Sisario, An Apology 
for Kim Dotcom, and a New Royalties Deal for Clear Channel, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Sept. 
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tacks were repeatedly thwarted, whether through superior counter-
measures or through clever workarounds such as the so-called “analog 
hole.”33 
In frustration, the music industry switched gears to identifying 
and suing individual file-sharers—a tack that was widely condemned 
by the public.34  Even before the advent of peer-to-peer file-sharing, 
                                               
27, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/digital-notes-
an-apology-for-kim-dotcom-and-a-new-royalties-deal-for-clear-channel/ (observing that the 
Megaupload case “is being watched intently . . . as a test of whether the United States can 
pursue copyright infringement cases overseas”).  The controversial (and ultimately unsuc-
cessful) Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and PROTECT IP Act (“PIPA”) legislative pro-
posals were promoted and defended as a necessary response to the ineffectiveness of copy-
right enforcement efforts abroad.  See infra note 54.  
 33.  See, e.g., Timothy L. O’Brien, Technology; Norwegian Hacker, 19, Is Acquitted in DVD 
Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at C4 (reporting on the acquittal of the Norwegian 
teenager who helped write DeCSS, the software program that disabled the original DRM 
system for DVDs); Liza Daly, The Analog Hole: Another Argument Against DRM, O’REILLY 
RADAR (Oct. 23, 2008), http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/10/the-analog-hole-in-digital-
boo.html (explaining that the analog hole is “the one weakness found in all DRM’ed me-
dia,” since it can be exploited just by playing the digital media and recording the analog 
output); Daniel Roth, The Pirates Can’t Be Stopped, UPSTART BUS. J. (Jan. 14, 2008, 6:00 AM), 
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/01/14/ 
Media-Defenders-Profile.html?page=all (describing the exploits of a high school hacker 
who broke into the servers of MediaDefender, an antipiracy company employed by the en-
tertainment industry, and exposed and discredited its methods).  Those failures eventually 
led the music industry to abandon DRM schemes.  See Brad Stone, Copy an iTunes Song? Go 
Ahead, Apple Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at B1 (reporting on the decision by all four ma-
jor music labels to begin selling digital music without DRM); Brad Stone & Jeff Leeds, Am-
azon to Sell Music Without Copy Protection, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at C1 (reporting on the 
much earlier decision to shed DRM by EMI, the only major music label to do so at the 
time). 
 34.  See David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual 
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1701–02 
(2005) (“Because the RIAA was unable to control the technology [of peer-to-peer file-
sharing], it instead focused on influencing end-user behavior.  To this end, in September 
2003 the RIAA began suing individual end users . . . .”); Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: 
The Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1 (relaying 
numerous concerns and criticisms expressed in reaction to the first set of lawsuits); John 
Schwartz, More Lawsuits Filed in Effort to Thwart File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at C4 
(reporting on more lawsuits filed in the RIAA’s “crusade against file sharing,” which con-
  
512 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:501 
the content industries had persuaded Congress to include in the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)35 a provision to expedite the 
identification of suspected copyright infringers.  Just by filing a sub-
poena request with the clerk of any federal district court, copyright 
holders could easily compel an Internet service provider to furnish 
the identity of any alleged infringer.36  After successfully persuading a 
few district courts to accept the use of the DMCA procedural 
shortcut,37 the RIAA issued more than 1,500 subpoenas, filed lawsuits 
against several hundred individuals, and reached settlements with 
many others.38 
                                               
tinued to receive censure as a strategy that was “wreak[ing] havoc on ordinary people” and 
that would “really backfire”). 
 35.  Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 512, 1201-05, 1301-32, 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006)). 
 36.  17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1)–(4) (2006); Kristina Groennings, Note, Costs and Benefits of 
the Recording Industry’s Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 574 (2005) 
(“[Section] 512(h) provided a fast, cheap mechanism for discovering suspected file-
sharers’ identities.  The RIAA needed only to supply $35, a copy of notification, the pro-
posed subpoena, and a sworn declaration that the information sought was for the sole 
purpose of protecting copyright.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., RIAA v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246–47 (D.D.C. 
2003) (denying Verizon’s motion to quash the RIAA’s DMCA subpoena), rev’d, 351 F.3d 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003); RIAA v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 
2003) (granting the RIAA’s motion to enforce its DMCA subpoena), rev’d, 351 F.3d 1229 
(D.C. Cir. 2003); see also RIAA v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 772–74 (8th Cir. 
2005) (vacating the lower court’s issuance of DMCA subpoenas to the RIAA); Pac. Bell In-
ternet Servs. v. RIAA, No. C03-3560, 2003 WL 22862662, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2003) 
(dismissing an Internet service provider’s request for declaratory judgment to invalidate 
the DMCA subpoena provision). 
 38.  See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER 3 (2008), 
available at https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf (“Verizon and the privacy 
advocates lost the first rounds in court.  That gave the RIAA the green light to start deliver-
ing thousands of subpoenas . . . .  Between August and September 2003, the RIAA issued 
more than 1,500 subpoenas to ISPs around the country. On September 8, 2003, the RIAA 
announced the first 261 lawsuits against individuals that it had identified using the DMCA 
subpoenas.”).  The RIAA changed its strategy in response to criticism and “began sending 
threat letters [before suing an individual directly], giving the accused an opportunity to 
settle the matter before a lawsuit was filed.”  Id.; see also Opderbeck, supra note 34, at 1705–
07 (stating that most defendants choose to settle rather than incur the costs of litigation 
and that “many trial courts endorse [that] strategy by issuing broad discovery orders and 
approving form settlements”). 
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The music industry’s aggressive use of DMCA subpoenas was 
overturned on appeal in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.39  Based 
on a technical reading of the statute, the appellate court exempted all 
ordinary Internet service providers (“ISPs”) from the subpoena provi-
sion, ruling that only certain providers (those that actively stored in-
fringing materials on their servers) could be served proper notice 
within the meaning of the statute.40  While the Verizon decision did not 
preclude the possibility of acquiring user identities through other 
means,41 it was emblematic of a general reluctance among the courts 
to commit drastic changes to the established contours of online ano-
nymity. 
Undeterred, the RIAA pursued other ways to identify infringing 
users.  One route involved petitioning the courts by filing “John Doe” 
lawsuits.  Unlike the DMCA subpoenas, which could be obtained 
without formal proceedings, the “John Doe” subpoenas required a 
pending cause of action.42  To save on legal fees, however, the RIAA 
filed the claims en masse.43  Coming on the heels of the furor over the 
DMCA subpoenas, the strategy smelled like a bad-faith workaround, 
and so the courts again balked at giving away identities so freely.44  
                                               
 39.  351 F.3d 1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also supra note 37. 
 40.  Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231, 1233; accord Charter Commc’ns, 393 F.3d at 771, 776–77. 
 41.  Cf. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231 (declining to rule on Verizon’s claim that the DMCA 
subpoena provision “violates the First Amendment because it lacks sufficient safeguards to 
protect an internet user’s ability to speak and to associate anonymously”). 
 42.  The “John Doe” lawsuits proceeded in the following manner: 
[T]he record label lawyers sued unidentified “John  Doe” uploaders that their 
investigators  had traced to an IP address.  After filing the lawsuit, the record la-
bels would ask the court to authorize subpoenas against the ISPs.  After deliver-
ing these subpoenas and obtaining the real name of the subscriber behind the IP 
address, the record label lawyers would then either deliver a letter demanding a 
settlement or amend their lawsuit to name the identified individual. 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 38, at 4.   
 43.  See Opderbeck, supra note 34, at 1703–04 (comparing the RIAA end-user litigation 
to mass tort litigation in three respects: “Groups of ostensibly related cases are centralized 
in one court; the suits are not filed as discrete actions relating to each set of transactions; 
and discovery is managed, at least initially, on a collective basis”). 
 44.  See id. at 1707–08 (stating that “not all trial courts have been so sanguine about the 
RIAA’s tactics” and describing how some courts have raised administrative concerns over 
“the RIAA plaintiffs [attempting to] avoid paying individual filing fees by aggregating 
claims against Doe defendants”). 
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Some courts refused to allow the mass joinders on the basis of unfair-
ness to individual defendants.45  Other courts focused on the unfair-
ness to ISPs, and offered protective measures such as limiting the 
number of identification requests and requiring full reimbursement 
for any costs incurred in fulfilling the requests.46  Those rulings con-
tributed to making the mass litigation strategy prohibitively expen-
sive,47 and the RIAA subsequently announced that it was suspending 
its campaign.48 
                                               
 45.  See, e.g., BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. Civ.A. 04-650, 2004 WL 953888, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 2, 2004) (ruling that joinder was improper because “[p]laintiffs are attempting to 
bring over [200] factually distinct actions in one lawsuit[, but e]ach claim involves differ-
ent property, facts, and defenses”); see also Opderbeck, supra note 34, at 1708 & n.104 (not-
ing decisions in Florida, Georgia, and Pennsylvania rejecting joinder of claims against 
hundreds of individual defendants because there was no joint action or connective nexus 
among the defendants).  But see Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 
2d 332, 344 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that unnamed parties cannot demonstrate any harm 
because they “are not required to respond to the plaintiffs’ allegations or assert a defense,” 
and adding that “joinder in a single case of the putative defendants who allegedly in-
fringed the same copyrighted material . . . is beneficial to the putative defendants”). 
 46.  DigiProtect USA Corp. v. Does 1-240, No. 10 Civ. 8760(PAC), 2011 WL 4444666, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (noting that “[DigiProtect] should recognize that its approach 
imposes a substantial burden on parties [like the ISPs] with no formal interest in the out-
come of the litigation” and “requir[ing] DigiProtect to reimburse the ISPs for the cots 
[sic] incurred in each IP address look-up, including notifying the relevant subscribers”).  
But see Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 355–59 (denying motions by ISP Time 
Warner to quash mass subpoenas, because its claims of undue burden were contradicted 
by the evidence, and all costs would be covered by the plaintiffs). 
 47.  See Lemley & Reese, supra note 24, at 1376–77 (calculating the costs of end-user 
litigation, and observing that “suing even a fraction of the end users could bankrupt the 
content industries”); Mike Masnick, RIAA Spent $17.6 Million in Lawsuits . . . to Get $391,000 
in Settlements?, TECHDIRT (July 14, 2010, 9:44 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/2010 
0713/17400810200.shtml (characterizing the RIAA lawsuits as “an economic disaster” and 
noting that the record industry “admitted [they] were ‘a money pit’”). 
 48.  Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 19, 2008, at B1.  Reports indicate that more than 30,000 suits were filed, including 
both named and John Doe suits, and over 18,000 people were contacted—of whom 11,000 
settled immediately or were not prosecuted, and 7,000 were sued in federal court. Nate 
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Instead, the music industry has now turned to the option of part-
nering directly with ISPs and other third parties to access user infor-
mation, which avoids the friction, expense, and uncertainty of litiga-
tion.  In the United States, the major ISPs have agreed to participate 
in a “six-strikes” plan, which would allow the RIAA to send copyright 
infringers several warnings before initiating an escalating series of 
punitive measures.49  In Great Britain, a similar arrangement was an-
nounced in 2009—though it was later abandoned—in which an ISP 
had offered to assist with policing copyright infringement on its net-
work in exchange for access to unrestricted music downloads for its 
customers.50  Other developments, such as the rising popularity of 
subscription-based streaming services,51 may create additional oppor-
tunities to forge private partnerships that give content owners direct 
control over subscriber identities. 
Of course, it should be noted that the pursuit of identity-based 
solutions does not mean that the content industries have abandoned 
other efforts.  Generativity is still at stake in ongoing lawsuits against 
intermediaries such as YouTube and MegaUpload,52 the ongoing de-
velopment of new DRM systems,53 and efforts to alter the Internet’s 
                                               
 49.  See Ross Drath, Hotfile, Megaupload, and the Future of Copyright on the Internet: What 
Can Cyberlockers Tell Us About DMCA Reform?, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 204, 
233–34 & n.215 (2012) (describing the terms of the arrangement); David Kravets, Copyright 
Scofflaws Beware: ISPs to Begin Monitoring Illicit File Sharing, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2012, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/isp-file-sharing-monitoring/ (reporting the 
additional measures as including “temporary reductions of internet speeds, redirection to 
a[n educational] landing page . . . , or other measures (as specified in published policies) 
that the ISP may deem necessary to help resolve the matter”). 
 50.  Eric Pfanner, Universal Music and Virgin Reach a Download Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2009, at B2.  That deal was eclipsed by a subsequent agreement between Virgin Media and 
Spotify, a Swedish music-streaming service.  David Meyer, Virgin Media: Spotify Deal Will 
Bring Down Piracy, ZDNET (July 6, 2011, 2:57 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/virgin-media-
spotify-deal-will-bring-down-piracy-3040093328/. 
 51.  Brad Stone, The Music Streams That Soothe an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at 
BU3. 
 52.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing dis-
missal of copyright claims against YouTube for hosting infringing videos); Ben Sisario, U.S. 
Charges Popular Site with Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at B1 (reporting the case against 
MegaUpload, which operated a network of “cyberlocker” services). 
 53.  See Michelle Kung, Movies in the Clouds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2011 (describing the 
movie industry’s UltraViolet initiative); Brad Stone, Amazon Faces a Fight Over Its E-Books, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at B3 (discussing Amazon’s use of DRM for the Kindle). 
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domain name system to enable the unilateral takedown of any offend-
ing website.54 
As a policy matter, the question of whether the copyright system 
needs substantive reform has become highly contentious in recent 
years,55 but this Article is not an attempt to revisit that debate.  Rather, 
the point here is simply that, if we assume the copyright system will be 
enforced, then the path of regulation will travel through either ano-
nymity or generativity.  Protecting both is a two-front war that cannot 
be won. 
B.  Adult Content and the Child Online Protection Act 
The fight to make the Internet safer for children has also cen-
tered on the choice between anonymity and generativity, and again 
shows how excluding one regulatory lever implicitly forces regulators 
to lean more heavily on the other one.  From the outset, Congress was 
focused on restricting anonymity.  Both the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”)56 and the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”)57 were 
attempts to require distributors of online pornography to identify us-
ers by age.  The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, was 
skeptical of applying an identity-based approach to the Internet, and 
rebuffed those efforts in favor of alternative solutions such as content 
filters. 
The CDA, enacted in 1996, sought to reinstate the offline norm 
of requiring proof of proper age in order to obtain sexually explicit 
                                               
 54.  See Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); PROTECT 
IP Act (“PIPA”), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Mark Lemley, David S. Levine & David 
G. Post, Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011); Jenna Wortham, Protest 
on Web Takes on 2 Bills Aimed at Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A1; Rebecca MacKin-
non, Op-Ed, Stop the Great Firewall of America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/firewall-law-could-infringe-on-free-speech 
.html (arguing that SOPA and PIPA “would empower the attorney general to create a 
blacklist of sites to be blocked by Internet service providers, search engines, payment pro-
viders and advertising networks, all without a court hearing or a trial”); see also supra note 
32. 
 55.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF 
CREATIVITY (2004).  
 56.  Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133–43 (1996), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 57.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XIV, 112 Stat. 2681-736 to 2681-741 (1998), invalidated by 
ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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materials.  To be sure, the statute imposed criminal penalties on any-
one who used an interactive computer service to transmit “obscene,” 
“indecent,” or “patently offensive” materials to persons under eight-
een years of age.58  But the true thrust of the CDA lay in its affirmative 
defenses, which provided immunity to those who validated age “by re-
quiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, 
or adult personal identification number,” or by taking other “good 
faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions” to restrict access 
by minors.59  In effect, Congress’s intention was to compel the use of 
identification measures, not to prohibit the transmission of adult con-
tent over the Internet. 
In Reno v. ACLU,60 the Supreme Court invalidated the CDA for 
two reasons.  First, the statute was poorly drafted—the terms “inde-
cent” and “patently offensive” had been left undefined, and potential-
ly swept in “large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious 
educational or other value.”61  Because the coverage was overbroad, 
and the sanctions so severe, the Court feared that the statute would 
unintentionally silence constitutionally protected speech.62 
                                               
 58.  See Reno, 521 U.S. at 858–60 (describing the “indecent transmission” provision and 
the “patently offensive display” provision of the statute). 
 59.  Id. at 860–61 & n.26.  But see Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA II), 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing concern that affirmative defenses “cannot guarantee 
freedom from prosecution,” and that “[s]peakers who dutifully place their content behind 
age screens may nevertheless find themselves in court, forced to prove the lawfulness of 
their speech on pain of criminal conviction”).  COPA took the same approach as the CDA, 
using similar language to provide an affirmative defense for 
the defendant [who], in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material 
that is harmful to minors—(A) by requiring the use of a credit card, debit ac-
count, adult access code, or adult personal identification number; (B) by accept-
ing a digital certificate that verifies age; or (C) by any other reasonable measures 
that are feasible under available technology. 
47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).  But see Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: 
A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 418 (1999) (describing the ways in which 
the affirmative defenses in COPA were broader than those contained in the CDA). 
 60.  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 61.  Id. at 871 & n.35, 877. 
 62.  Id. at 871–72, 874 (“The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern . . . 
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech” and because “[t]he severity of crimi-
nal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even ar-
guably unlawful words, ideas, and images. . . .  Given the vague contours of the coverage of 
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More importantly, though, the Court concluded that there was 
no good way to authenticate the ages of Internet users.63  Had such an 
option been technologically and economically feasible at the time, 
perhaps the affirmative defenses would have negated the risk of crim-
inal sanction and saved the CDA.  Instead, the Court found the af-
firmative defenses to be illusory because age verification methods 
were still “unproven future technology.”64 
In response, Congress immediately redrafted the legislation to 
address the Court’s concerns, and enacted it as COPA.65  In Ashcroft v. 
ACLU,66 the Court acknowledged that, as a result of those efforts, 
COPA successfully fixed the problems of statutory scope that had 
plagued the CDA.67  But by that time the culture of anonymity had 
                                               
the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to 
constitutional protection.”). 
 63.  Id. at 855–57, 876–77 (“The District Court found that at the time of trial existing 
technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from ob-
taining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to 
adults. . . .  As a practical matter, the Court also found that it would be prohibitively ex-
pensive for noncommercial—as well as some commercial—speakers who have Web sites to 
verify that their users are adults.”). 
 64.  Id. at 881–82; see also Lessig & Resnick, supra note 59, at 418 (commenting that the 
Supreme Court read the affirmative defenses in the CDA “not as an ordinary tort standard 
[of reasonableness], but as an absolute effectiveness requirement”). 
 65.  Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA II), 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (“COPA is the second at-
tempt by Congress to make the Internet safe for minors by criminalizing certain Internet 
speech.  The first attempt was the [CDA].”); see also supra note 59. 
 66.  Ashcroft v. ACLU (COPA I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 67.  See id. at 578–79 (“COPA . . . does not appear to suffer from the same flaw [of 
overbreadth and vagueness] because it applies to significantly less material than did the 
CDA and defines the harmful-to-minors material restricted by the statute in a manner par-
allel to the Miller definition of obscenity.”); see also COPA II, 542 U.S. at 660, 665 (noting 
that “[i]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on this 
subject, in particular the decision in Reno,” and declining to review the lower court’s find-
ing of unconstitutionality based on statutory construction); id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (observing that “Congress . . . dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that 
would meet each and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in 
Reno”).  Specifically, Congress imported language directly from the obscenity standard ar-
ticulated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); narrowed COPA to cover only commer-
cial material; relaxed the criminal sanctions by reducing the maximum term of imprison-
ment from two years to six months; and lowered the age threshold to seventeen years.  See 
COPA I, 535 U.S. at 569–71; S. REP. NO. 105-225 (1998). 
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become so embedded in the Internet that the Court was loath to up-
root it.  The Court invalidated COPA on the grounds that there were 
other alternatives, such as filtering software, that were less restrictive 
than COPA’s age verification scheme.68   
To the Court, filtering software was preferable precisely because 
it did not require adults to reveal identifying information in order to 
gain access to explicit materials.69  The Court claimed that filtering 
software was less restrictive because it was a “selective” restriction, vis-
ited only upon those children whose parents opted in and chose to 
install the software.70  Anyone not using the filtering software would 
remain unaffected.71  By contrast, COPA was a “universal” restriction 
applied at the source; all adults would be burdened by having to dis-
close identifying information that otherwise could remain secret.72 
The Court’s decision invalidating COPA embodies the generative 
tradeoff: By rejecting approaches that rely on identification, the Court 
forced regulators to turn to approaches that lock down functionality.  
An age-check mechanism minimizes the need for technological inter-
vention because it enlists the cooperation of the appropriate parties 
on both sides, that is, adult viewers and content providers.  By con-
trast, a filtering wall places its reliance solely on technological con-
trols, not just to block inappropriate content but—more troublingly—
to block users from circumventing the controls (and the controls on 
those controls). 
The selective/universal distinction emphasized by the Court was 
the wrong dichotomy.  The affirmative defenses in COPA did not 
specify that age verification needed to be performed locally or re-
                                               
 68.  COPA II, 542 U.S. at 666–70 (majority opinion). 
 69.  Id. at 667 (finding filters to be less restrictive than COPA in part because, “[u]nder 
a filtering regime, adults without children may gain access to speech they have a right to 
see without having to identify themselves or provide their credit card information”). 
 70.  Id. (“Filters . . . impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not 
universal restrictions at the source.”). 
 71.  Id. (“Under a filtering regime, . . . [e]ven adults with children may obtain access to 
the same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their home comput-
ers.”). 
 72.  See supra note 70.  As an aside, the Court’s statement assumed that the adults’ 
identifying information should remain secret.  But see COPA II, 542 U.S. at 683 (Breyer J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging that identification requirements may lead users to fear embar-
rassment, but noting that the Constitution does not protect against such embarrassment in 
other contexts such as libraries and nightclubs).  
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motely.73  In other words, age-validating software can be installed on 
home computers in the same “selective” manner as content-filtering 
software.74  Conversely, content filters can be installed remotely to 
have a “universal” effect on all Internet users.75 
More importantly, the Court’s discussion obscured the fact that if 
we are genuinely committed to the goal of restricting “children” from 
accessing “inappropriate materials,” then age verification and content 
filtering are equally unavoidable components, respectively.76  The real 
issues at stake are: (1) who should be required to disclose their identi-
ties—adults or children; and (2) who should be responsible for label-
ing and restricting access to adult materials—content providers or 
third-party screeners.  In effect, COPA chose “adults” and “content 
providers,” while the Court favored “children” and “third-party 
screeners.”  The Court’s judgment was sensible when considering an-
onymity interests alone, but it was not duly mindful of the generative 
trade-off. 
A child-ID scheme—i.e., any setup that affects only a child’s In-
ternet usage—avoids disturbing the anonymity interest of adults, be-
cause it allows adults to continue to view adult content without having 
to reveal their age or any other identifying information.77  Likewise, a 
third-party filtering scheme protects the “anonymity” of adult-content 
                                               
 73.  See Lessig & Resnick, supra note 59, at 419 (“If . . . asking whether COPA mandated 
the least burdensome adult-ID regime possible, then we believe this statute does impose 
the smallest adult-ID regime burden possible . . . [because] COPA includes a catchall pro-
vision that permits ‘any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available tech-
nology.’”).  
 74.  For example, a “kids-mode browser” could identify its user as a minor and request 
websites to block harmful content accordingly, without affecting the browsing activities of 
adults.  See id. at 416–22 (describing a hypothetical kids-mode browsers as an alternative to 
the CDA and COPA); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might 
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 516–19 (1999) (same). 
 75.  See Robert A. Gomez, Protecting Minors from Online Pornography Without Violating the 
First Amendment, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (describing the available filter 
options as including not only client-side filtering software, but also filters installed by in-
termediaries such as ISPs, search engines, and local server operators). 
 76.  But see COPA II, 542 U.S. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that some 
Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the view that the First Amendment 
simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area.”).   
 77.  Id. at 667 (majority opinion). 
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providers in the sense that they are not obligated to label themselves 
as being harmful to children.78 
The generative difference lies in how that system fails.  First, in-
dependent entities that process and screen large quantities of content 
can be expected to make more classification errors than content pro-
viders that are individually responsible for selecting and serving the 
content themselves.79  In part, those classification errors are caused by 
mistake and uncertainty; yet there is also a natural incentive to err on 
the side of overblocking rather than underblocking, since content fil-
ters are created and marketed to block content rather than to allow 
content.  That danger is compounded when features that should be 
available, and content that should be viewable, are seamlessly con-
cealed, making it difficult to even recognize when a mistake has oc-
curred. 
Second, it is far more likely that a child-ID scheme would fail to 
flag a child than that an adult-ID scheme would allow a child to mas-
querade as an adult using false credentials.80  Blocking a child’s access 
                                               
 78.  Id. (“[P]romoting the use of filters does not condemn as criminal any category of 
speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least much diminished.”); cf. 
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Adult Websites and the Top-Level Domain Debate: ICANN’s 
Adoption of .XXX Draws Adult-Industry Ire, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 527, 529 (2011) 
(describing objections from the adult entertainment industry against the creation of a new 
.XXX domain name label, including that it would “provide a very convenient tool for 
those who have the power to either censor or prevent lawful speech to be disseminated”).  
But see Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Untangling Child Pornography from the Adult Enter-
tainment Industry: An Inside Look at the Industry’s Efforts to Protect Minors, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 
511, 520, 536–40 (2008) (describing a self-regulatory initiative by the adult entertainment 
industry to create a “Restricted to Adults” (“RTA”) website label, and noting further that 
adult sites are already labeled “Sexually Explicit” or “Adult” because they want to be 
found”). 
 79.  See COPA II, 542 U.S. at 685–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that filtering 
software suffers from serious problems of underblocking and overblocking); cf. id. at 671 
(majority opinion) (“[T]here is a serious gap in the evidence as to the effectiveness of fil-
tering software.”); United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 221–22 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing “fundamental defects in the filtering software that is 
now available or that will be available in the foreseeable future”). 
 80.  In COPA II, the Court noted that age verification systems could be “subject to eva-
sion and circumvention, for example, by minors who have their own credit cards.”  Id. at 
668 (majority opinion).  Of course, if that were the Court’s real concern, then the Court 
should have been even more critical of opt-in filtering schemes, which allow children to 
pass as adults by default.  Cf. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128–31 
  
522 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:501 
across all Internet devices is a Herculean task compared with blocking 
a child’s access to adult credentials.  Thus, although the Court praised 
the “selective” nature of end-user filtering software—that is, voluntary 
identification of children by their parents—the dissent’s rejoinder was 
that many parents had neither the money nor the attention to impose 
that limitation on their children.81  If a substantial amount of that “se-
lective” inaction is in fact involuntary, the collective backlash will push 
filtering systems to be embedded at more “universal” locations such as 
ISPs, search engines, and public computers.82  In other words, the 
Court’s rejection of adult identification, combined with the general 
ineffectiveness of child identification, will lead not to an abandon-
ment of purpose, but rather to a redoubling of efforts against the 
tools of enablement. 
When we abandon identification as a regulatory tool, we encour-
age regulators to encroach on generative qualities.  Since the demise 
of COPA, advocates have made progress in promoting proposals such 
as the mandatory zoning of explicit content, which would divide the 
Internet at an architectural layer into a “green” zone and a “red” 
zone.83  Such a proposal could successfully screen content for minors 
                                               
(1989) (discussing the likelihood that “enterprising youngsters could and would evade the 
rules and gain access to communications from which they should be shielded”); Janine 
Hiller et al., POCKET Protection, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 441–44 (2008) (describing the inef-
fectiveness of the parental consent model in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 
which also constitutes a child-ID scheme). 
 81.  See COPA II, 542 U.S. at 685 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that many parents 
do not have the money or the attention to impose filtering software on their children).  
But see id. at 669–70 (majority opinion) (“COPA presumes that parents lack the ability, not 
the will, to monitor what their children see.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 
529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000) (“[A] court should not presume parents, given full information, 
will fail to act.”). 
 82.  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding 
the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which requires federally funded libraries to install 
filtering software on all publicly accessible computers). 
 83.  See COMM’N ON CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS 31 (2000), 
available at http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf (discussing a pro-
posal for the “[e]stablishment of a ‘green zone’ or ‘red light zone’ by means of allocation 
of a new set of IP numbers” and concluding that “[t]echnical difficulties involved in im-
plementing this technology make effectiveness uncertain”).  The first step to pushing such 
content into a separate top-level domain was passed in early 2011.  See Jacqui Cheng, 
ICANN Approves .XXX Red-Light District for the Internet, WIRED.COM (Mar. 19, 2011, 2:06 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/03/icann-approves-xxx.  Other methods of seg-
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without forcing adults to reveal any identifying information, but the 
cost to generativity would be high.84  Requiring adult content to re-
main technologically segregated at all times would make it difficult to 
create or do anything online that might blur or cross the boundary 
lines.85  Services that host user-generated content would become in-
feasible; search engines and data storage services would be hobbled; 
advertisements and other embedded content would have to be re-
worked; commenting systems would have to be curtailed.  All that ex-
tra cost might permit adults to consume pornography anonymously—
but then again it might be simpler just to show ID. 
C.  Spam and the CAN-SPAM Act 
The example of unsolicited “spam” emails bears close resem-
blance to the example of adult content—and not just because spam 
was once a heavy carrier of pornography.  In both contexts, the wholly 
subjective nature of the problem and the wide disparities in recipient 
preferences make it difficult to draw clear boundaries around objec-
tionable content.  Additionally, a substantial proportion of the abuse 
                                               
regating content have been proposed as well.  See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Inter-
net: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1431–32 (2007) 
(discussing the use of separate Internet ports as a means of regulating online content). 
 84.  See COMM’N ON CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION, supra note 83, at 31 (evaluating the 
red zone/green zone proposal and noting that “[t]his approach could potentially reduce 
flexibility and impede optimal network performance”); ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 154–57 
(describing the generative cost of dividing a PC into two virtual machines, a Green PC and 
a Red PC, which would segregate “reliable software and important data” from “everything 
else”). 
 85.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 156–57 (“[M]any of the benefits of generativity come 
precisely thanks to an absence of walls. . . .  [W]e may be hesitant to adopt complex access 
control and privilege lists to designate what software can and cannot do.”).  That disad-
vantage would explain why the dot-kids domain has failed so spectacularly.  Maintaining a 
sterile, rigid sandbox makes it unappealing to populate with either content or usertime.  
See Press Release, NeuStar, Inc., NeuStar Announces Significant Wholesale Price Reduc-
tions for KIDS.US Registrars (June 20, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ 
neustar-announces-significant-wholesale-price-reductions-for-kidsus-registrars-58226767. 
html (describing significant reductions in price for domain name registrations at KIDS.US, 
as well as other efforts to “raise awareness among both potential content providers and the 
ultimate users of the space,” reflecting the dismal unpopularity of kids-only zones). 
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is conducted by bad actors (many foreign) who are financially moti-
vated to evade regulatory efforts.86 
An important difference, however, is that the identity-centric ap-
proach has been embraced in the spam context.  In 2003, Congress 
passed the CAN-SPAM Act,87 which neatly divides the problem into 
two spheres: civil guidelines for mainstream marketers willing to con-
form their behavior to regulation, and criminal provisions for rogue 
entities tempted to avoid compliance by remaining anonymous.88  In 
the civil section, Congress mandated an opt-out mechanism that al-
lows recipients to refuse future messages, and requires senders to 
identify themselves accurately and conspicuously so that recipients are 
not misled when choosing to opt out.89  The criminal section, then, is 
directed at the remaining parties who would ignore the civil regula-
tions by hiding behind false mail headers, open relays, zombie com-
puters, and other anonymizing means.90  Framed in that manner, it is 
not surprising that the identification requirements have gone unchal-
lenged—the affected parties are either legitimate companies unwill-
ing to be associated with fraudulent spam or illegitimate groups with 
little interest in coming forward to petition the courts of law.91 
                                               
 86.  See COPA II, 542 U.S. at 667 (noting that a substantial amount of pornography 
comes from overseas, and that “COPA does not prevent minors from having access to 
those foreign harmful materials”); cf. id. at 663 (describing other efforts by Congress “to 
prevent Web site owners from disguising pornographic Web sites in a way likely to cause 
uninterested persons to visit them”). 
 87.  Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 
(“CAN-SPAM”), Pub. L. No. 108–187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13, 18 
U.S.C. § 1037 (2006)). 
 88.  See Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-Based Policy Ap-
proach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. ¶ 1, ¶¶ 66–72 (2005) (detailing 
criminal provisions and civil prohibitions); John Soma, Patrick Singer & Jeffrey Hurd, 
Spam Still Pays: The Failure of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 and Proposed Legal Solutions, 45 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 165, 178 (2008) (“The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 does not outlaw spam per 
se, but instead divides the universe of spam into lawful and unlawful categories.”). 
 89.  15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(4)–(5). 
 90.  18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)–(b); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, EFFECTIVENESS AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS A-2 to A-3 (2005), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/051220canspamrpt.pdf (explaining that 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1037(a)(1)–(3) criminalize the use of “zombie drones,” “open relays with intent 
to deceive,” and “materially false header information,” respectively). 
 91.  Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 8 (“CAN-SPAM has established a 
framework for lawful commercial email, and legitimate marketers are largely complying 
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The main criticism of CAN-SPAM has been that it is anemic and 
ineffective.92  Much of that discussion has focused on the civil provi-
sions, lambasting the opt-out framework for being too lenient93 and, 
by extension, the federal pre-emption provision for prohibiting indi-
vidual states from experimenting with stricter opt-in schemes.94  Such 
debates miss the boat, however, since the overwhelming majority of 
spam comes from sources that would refuse to comply regardless of 
what those alternative schemes might be.95  The merits of a civil regu-
                                               
with it, as evidenced by a July 2005 FTC staff study of CAN-SPAM compliance by 100 top 
online marketers or ‘etailers’ with the opt-out provisions of the Act.”), with Bambauer, su-
pra note 88, at ¶ 85 (citing a report that “95% of spammers were ‘ignoring the law com-
pletely’” and noting that spammers have “also reacted to CAN SPAM by shifting activities 
to foreign jurisdictions such as China that do not criminalize their activities”); see also Ad-
am Hamel, Note, Will the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on Unsolicited E-Mail?, 39 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 961, 994–95 (2004–2005) (noting that one surprising effect of CAN-
SPAM was “the temporary reduction in commercial e-mail from ‘legitimate’ on-line mar-
keters immediately after the Act went into effect” in order to “digest the law,” while “dis-
reputable spammers . . . reacted to CAN-SPAM by ignoring it, or by trying to find ways 
around it”). 
 92.  See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 88, at 83–85 (“CAN SPAM has been widely derided 
as ineffective. . . .  [S]pam’s share of e-mail traffic has increased since CAN SPAM 
passed.”); Soma, Singer & Hurd, supra note 88, at 178–79 (“[CAN-SPAM] has been ineffec-
tive.  Confirming the predictions of some experts, the volume of spam has actually in-
creased since the passage of the Act.”); Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Michael B. de Leeuw, SPAM 
After CAN-SPAM: How Inconsistent Thinking Has Made a Hash Out of Unsolicited Commercial E-
Mail Policy, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 887, 895–96 (2004) (“Critics 
also point out that the Act pointedly refrains from providing any private right of action to 
individual victims of spam.  Instead, it vests all enforcement authority in the hands of fed-
eral and state agencies and, to some extent, ISPs.”). 
 93.  See Soma, Singer & Hurd, supra note 88, at 178–79 (criticizing the opt-out provi-
sion as having “proven to be like trusting the fox with watching over the hen house,” and 
noting that “spam experts discourage the use of opt-out features found in e-mails”); Sulli-
van & de Leeuw, supra note 92, at 895 (explaining anti-spam activists’ complaint that the 
opt-out provision shifts the burden of avoiding spam from the sender to the receiver). 
 94.  See, e.g., Sullivan & de Leeuw, supra note 92, at 898–90 (explaining anti-spam activ-
ists’ complaint that CAN-SPAM is inferior to anti-spam regulations from other jurisdic-
tions); Katherine Wong, Recent Development, The Future of Spam Litigation After Omega 
World Travel v. Mummagraphics, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 459, 469, 473 (2007) (arguing 
that parallel state enforcement measures would be more effective at reducing spam than a 
national, uniform liability standard). 
 95.  See supra note 91. 
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lation cannot be evaluated based on harms that are being committed 
by anonymous actors. 
Instead, it is CAN-SPAM’s criminal provisions that are key be-
cause they establish a norm of identifiability.  Presently, spam activi-
ties are conducted almost entirely through a small number of “bot-
nets”—vast networks of computers that are owned and operated by 
legitimate users but covertly controlled by spammers.96  Botnets allow 
spammers to steal bandwidth and computational resources, while also 
obscuring the spammer’s trail and helping the spammer evade detec-
tion.97  One recent study found that, in the first half of 2011, just eight 
botnets were responsible for more than ninety percent of detected 
spam.98   
Because complex computer systems invariably contain errors and 
vulnerabilities, the likelihood that technological responses will eradi-
cate infiltrations is diminishingly small—especially as botnets have be-
come more sophisticated and capable of self-adapting to survive.99  In 
recent years, takedowns of major botnets such as Rustock,100 Mega-
                                               
 96.  See M86 SEC. LABS, SECURITY LABS REPORT: JANUARY–JUNE 2011 RECAP 6 (2011), 
available at http://www.sysec.co.uk/media/3357/m86_security_labs_report_1h2011.pdf 
(“The bulk of spam is emitted from botnets, which are networks of computers compro-
mised by malware.”); see also Wong, supra note 94, at 173 n.52 (“‘[B]otnets,’ are created by 
infecting unwitting users’ computers with malicious software designed specifically for the 
purpose of spamming.”); Nicholas Ianelli & Aaron Hackworth, Botnets as a Vehicle for Online 
Crime 15 (Proceedings of the International Conference of Forensic Computer Science, 
2006), http://www.icofcs.org/2006/ICoFCS2006-pp03.pdf (describing how legitimately 
owned and operated computers are taken over and controlled by botnets). 
 97.  See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deter-
rence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 415, 428–30 (2012) (“Botnets offer attackers 
many advantages, such as helping them to evade detection and enabling them to do more 
harm by controlling a large number of computers.”). 
 98.  M86 SEC. LABS, supra note 96, at 6–7. 
 99.  See, e.g., Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011 
(describing how the Stuxnet virus was able to evolve to avoid detection); John Markoff, 
Computer Experts Unite to Hunt Worm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A17 (discussing how the 
Conficker virus has been able to update itself in order to elude detection by computer se-
curity firms).  
 100.  Id. at 21; Nick Wingfield, Spam Network Shut Down, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2011, at B1 
(“The Rustock botnet [was] the largest source of spam in the world at the end of 
[2010].”). 
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D,101 and McColo,102 have led to meaningful dips in spam activity.103  
But those reprieves have been temporary, as spam operators remain-
ing at large have been able to resurrect and regrow their networks, or 
take over territory left behind by others.104 
More lasting success will depend on tracking down and prosecut-
ing the botnet operators.  CAN-SPAM’s criminal penalties are crucial 
in that regard because they validate efforts to root out identities, not 
just the latest malware.105  To be sure, legal remedies are not self-
executing, so identifiability remains an essential precondition to en-
forcement.106  One promising option is to enlist payment intermediar-
ies such as banks and credit cards, on the presumption that spam is 
fundamentally a for-profit business, and that money is harder to dis-
guise than bits.107  Whether identity is embedded in the network or 
                                               
 101.  Joe Barrett, Accused Spam King to Be Arraigned, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2010, at A4 (dis-
cussing the takedown of Mega-D); Jeremy Kirk, FireEye Moves Quickly to Quash Mega-D Botnet, 
REUTERS, Nov. 10, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/ 
urnidgns852573c4006938800025766a-idUS343920408120091110. 
 102.  Brian Krebs, Major Source of Online Scams and Spams Knocked Offline, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 11, 2008, 7:06 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/11/major_ 
source_of_online_scams_a.html (discussing the takedown of McColo Corp.); MARSHAL8E6 
TRACELABS, MARSHAL8E6 SECURITY THREATS: EMAIL AND WEB THREATS 3 (2009), available 
at http://www.marshal.com/newsimages/trace/marshal8e6_trace_report_jan2009.pdf 
(discussing the aftermath and implications of the McColo takedown). 
 103.  See e.g., M86 SEC. LABS, supra note 96, at 6 (“The Mega-D botnet slowly ground to a 
halt as law enforcement authorities identified and pursued the operator in late 2010.”); 
MARSHAL8E6 TRACELABS, supra note 102, at 3 (noting that spam dropped fifty percent 
overnight after the McColo botnet was disabled).  
 104.  See, e.g., MARSHAL8E6 TRACELABS, supra note 102, at 3 (“[M]ajor botnets with con-
trol servers hosted at McColo (Mega-D and Rustock) eventually recovered and continue to 
spam strongly.”). 
 105.  But see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 97, at 453–55 (detailing the many shortcomings 
of a cybercrime approach, including jurisdictional limitations, unwillingness to prosecute, 
difficulty of attribution, and other evidentiary problems). 
 106.  See infra notes 257–275 and accompanying text; cf. Hamel, supra note 91, at 1001 
(noting that computer scientists need to “develop a means of reliably identifying 
spammers [so that] law enforcement officials can locate spammers and prosecute them 
under the law”). 
 107.  See Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing About Online Liability and 
Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037 (2010) (arguing that payment intermediaries 
offer a way for governments to control illegal activities on the Internet); John Markoff, 
Study Sees Way to Win Spam Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2011, at B1 (reporting on a study find-
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elsewhere, however, the larger point is that the survival of CAN-SPAM 
represents a reversal from the invalidations of COPA and the CDA—
and a step toward normalizing the use of anonymity-restrictive 
measures to regulate Internet conduct. 
In the meantime, we should be highly skeptical of proposals that 
seek to modify email technology to fit the problem.  Economics-
minded commentators have pointed out that the profitability of spam 
depends on the zero marginal cost of email, and therefore have pro-
posed a range of solutions that would inject artificial cost into the 
equation.108  Such proposals include levying a tax on emails, requiring 
digital postage, compensating recipients for reading spam, adding 
temporal or computational penalties, and capping the total daily 
email traffic allowed per sender.109 
Making people pay for email is problematic in an immediate 
sense because the additional cost will likely be absorbed by botnet vic-
                                               
ing that “95 percent of the credit card transactions for the spam-advertised [products pur-
chased in the study] were handled by just three financial companies”); see also BEN HAYES, 
TRANSNAT’L INST. STATEWATCH, COUNTER-TERRORISM, ‘POLICY LAUNDERING’ AND THE 
FATF: LEGALISING SURVEILLANCE, REGULATING CIVIL SOCIETY 21 (2012) (describing the 
global enforcement regime that has been established by the Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”), and the “overall effect” it has had on “revers[ing] the long-established principle 
of secrecy in financial transactions and introduc[ing] a much broader framework for the 
surveillance of financial systems”). 
 108.  See Soma, Singer & Hurd, supra note 88, at 169 (“The economic efficiency of spam 
as an advertising tool contributes to the problem. . . .  The marginal cost of adding addi-
tional e-mail addresses to a recipient list is minimal, meaning that there is only a negligible 
cost difference between sending, for example, 1,000 and 10,000 spam e-mails.”); Jay P. 
Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 346 (2005) (“The ease of 
sending e-mail stems from the open philosophy designed into e-mail technologies. This 
has led some commentators to propose modifications to the underlying structure for 
transmitted e-mail messages.”); David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey, Jr., 
The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. ¶ 1, ¶¶ 18–
19 (2004) (“Spam presents a classic tragedy of the commons, arising because individual 
actors lack an adequate incentive to avoid overusing and abusing valuable re-
sources . . . .”). 
 109.  See Bambauer, supra note 88, ¶¶ 101-08, 164–69 (describing various proposals to 
impose artificial cost on the spammer such as a “spam tax,” e-mail postage, “hash cash,” 
bandwidth limits, reward-based postage, “attention bonds,” and more); Soma, Singer & 
Hurd, supra note 88, at 171–74 (describing email postage, computational charges, and 
email bonds); Hamel, supra note 91, at 1002–03 (describing the use of fees, CPU cycles, 
and “challenge-response” software). 
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tims (whose computers have been commandeered to send spam) ra-
ther than by the spammers themselves.110  But even if one takes the 
ruthless attitude that botnet victims should be given an incentive to 
clean up their computer systems, there is still a larger problem.  Mak-
ing email difficult to use makes email difficult to use.  Symbolically, it 
would represent a giant step back from the advances that we have 
achieved in global communications, and it would hobble the further 
development of innovative technologies and business methods that 
could otherwise be built on top of an unfettered email system.  In-
stead of fixing our sights directly on the real culprits, we would be tax-
ing ourselves twice: financially and innovationally. 
D.  Defamation and the Communications Decency Act 
Of all the online abuses mentioned thus far, the most distressing 
may be the casual perpetration of “trolling”111 and  cyberbullying.112  
Malicious barbs aired on discussion forums and social networking 
sites have devastated individuals and outraged communities.113  Those 
                                               
 110.  See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 111.  See Daniel H. Kahn, Social Intermediaries: Creating a More Responsible Web Through 
Portable Identity, Cross-Web Reputation, and Code-Backed Norms, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 176, 187 (2010) (“[A] ‘troll’ refers to someone who intentionally engages in disrup-
tive behavior characterized by abusiveness to other Web users.”); Julie Zhuo, Where Ano-
nymity Breeds Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A31 (“Trolling [is] defined as the act 
of posting inflammatory, derogatory or provocative messages in public forums.”). 
 112.  See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2009) (exploring the “gendered nature of online 
harassment” and “the expressive role that law can play in detrivializing cyber harassment”).  
But see Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 
117, 147–51 (1996) (“[M]ore defamation does not necessarily mean more harm; ‘anony-
mous remarks will be greatly devalued precisely because they are anonymous and easy to 
make.’ . . .  The effects of speech are difficult to predict because listeners are different; one 
man’s vulgarity may be another’s lyric.”). 
 113.  See, e.g., Tamara Jones, A Deadly Web of Deceit A Teen’s Online ‘Friend’ Proved False, and 
Cyber-Vigilantes are Avenging Her, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2008, at C1 (writing about Megan 
Meier, a teenager who committed suicide after being bullied through a fake MySpace ac-
count by a classmate’s mother); Tamar Lewin, Teenage Insults, Scrawled on Web, Not On 
Walls, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A1 (discussing the community outrage in response to 
Formspring, a social networking site that “has become a magnet for comments, many of 
them nasty and sexual, among the Facebook generation”); Choe Sang-Hun, Korean Star’s 
Suicide Reignites Debate on Web Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at B7 (describing the 
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who have sought to fight back have encountered two hurdles.  First, 
the Internet’s architectural protocols do not provide an easy way for 
one user to identify other users.114  Second, Internet intermediaries 
facilitating the misconduct have little incentive to assist victims by re-
moving or blocking such content, because section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act (“CDA”) immunizes any “interactive com-
puter service” from civil liability for third-party content.115 
The original motivation behind section 230 was to propel the 
generative potential of the Internet.  At the time, Congress was con-
cerned about sustaining the nascent growth of the Internet.116  Online 
providers were trapped between wanting to supervise and maintain 
                                               
national reaction to cyberbullying after the suicide of Choi Jin-sil, a famous South Korean 
actress who committed suicide because of malicious rumors written about her on the In-
ternet); A.G. Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves to the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, at A1 (describing how unsubstantiated gossip on small towns’ web-
sites has caused “widespread resentment in communities”); Heather Timmons, ‘Any Nor-
mal Human Being Would Be Offended’, N.Y. TIMES INDIA INK (Dec. 6, 2011, 7:35 AM), 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/any-normal-human-being-would-be-
offended/ (reporting that the Indian government has asked social media companies to 
create a mechanism for screening out offensive content from the Internet). 
 114.  See Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 397–400 
(2011) (explaining how the Internet’s architecture “provide[s] attackers numerous oppor-
tunities to hide their identities or assume another”). 
 115.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”); see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 
2003) (stating in dicta that, “[a]s precautions are costly, . . .  ISPs may be expected to take 
the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1)”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE 
FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 159 (2007) (“Un-
fortunately, courts are interpreting Section 230 so broadly as to provide too much immun-
ity, eliminating the incentive to foster a balance between speech and privacy.”); Ann 
Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 383, 412–22, 429 (2009) (noting that the unavailability of easy remedies 
against malicious online speech has created a market for reputation defense services, 
which have “unsavory incentives . . . to stir up trouble, or at least to perpetuate the condi-
tions that create it”). 
 116.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (stating among its policy goals: “to promote the con-
tinued development of the Internet,” and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet”); cf. S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 190 (1996) 
(expressing, with regard to a separate provision, the intent “to avoid impairing the growth 
of online communications”). 
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attractive forums for users, and being exposed to crippling liability if 
that oversight were construed as accepting editorial responsibility for 
user content.117  Congress therefore made a deliberate choice to prior-
itize the development of Internet services over the enforcement of 
tort liability.  The gambit has paid off handsomely: countless innova-
tive offerings have thrived on the Internet in large part because of 
section 230 immunity.118 
Now that the Internet has matured, many scholars have pointed 
the finger at section 230, characterizing it as a well-meaning but mis-
taken relic of a bygone era.119  In particular, the discrepancy that sec-
tion 230 sets up between offline liability and online liability has been 
well tread in the literature: Ordinarily, publishers and distributors of 
printed materials are subject to certain duties of care regarding de-
famatory content, but on the Internet none of those duties apply.120  
As a result of that immunity, it has become exceedingly easy to pub-
                                               
 117.  See Holland, supra note 19, at 370–72 (recounting the historical context leading to 
the passage of the CDA, in which online service providers complained that they faced a 
“Hobson’s choice” preventing them from creating “child safe” areas); Jonathan Zittrain, A 
History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 258–63 (2006) [hereinafter 
Zittrain, Online Gatekeeping] (same). 
 118.  See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 
433–36 (2009) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Expression] (“Because online service providers are 
insulated from liability, they have built a wide range of different applications and services 
that allow people to speak to each other and make things together.”); Nicholas W. Bram-
ble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 101, 133–34 
(2013) (“Together, section 512 of the DMCA and section 230(c) of the CDA risk a good 
deal of unregulated creativity and communication on the boundaries of copyright law and 
defamation law, on the theory that the rewards of such creativity . . . outweigh the risks of 
inefficient policing of violations of copyright, defamation, and obscenity law.”). 
 119.  See Kahn, supra note 111, at 189–93 & n.86 (2010) (describing the general discon-
tent with section 230, and collecting academic articles calling for reform); Holland, supra 
note 19, at 392–93 (“Early critics of § 230 tended to focus on the issues of congressional 
intent and broad interpretation by the courts.  More recent commentators have moved 
beyond these issues to engage the larger implications of providing such sweeping immuni-
ty to online intermediaries, suggesting amendments to § 230 intended to effectuate poli-
cies of efficiency and cost allocation.”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Holland, supra note 19, at 374–75; Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the 
Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 197–98 (2006); Paul 
Ehrlich, Note, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401, 404–05 & 
n.29 (2002); Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liabil-
ity for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 492–93 (2004). 
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lish offensive statements online, and exceedingly difficult to expunge 
them from the record once they are posted—a problem that is further 
compounded by the Internet’s broad reach.121  Nevertheless, courts 
have consistently upheld that interpretation of section 230 immunity 
as a faithful reflection of congressional intent.122 
Despite the rising calls for reform, it is not clear that section 230 
has outlived its usefulness.  The Internet has matured, but it is not 
dead.  Narrowing the scope of section 230 would certainly aid in de-
terring defamation and sanitizing the Internet, but it would do so by 
forcing intermediaries to become more circumspect about tolerating 
experimental uses.123  Few entities, if any, would be able to absorb the 
cost of indemnifying user-generated content, and those that could 
would likely demur.124  Typically, that problem is presented in terms 
of harm to speech interests, i.e., that intermediaries will engage in 
“collateral censorship” by erring on the side of caution and suppress-
                                               
 121.  See Bartow, supra note 115, at 418 (“By writing § 230 into law, Congress left . . . In-
ternet harassment victims vulnerable and helpless, especially if they are not able inde-
pendently to identify the sources of the abuse, or to acquire forcibly identifying infor-
mation from an ISP, assuming it had been logged, via the subpoena power of the courts.”).  
But see Holland, supra note 19, at 393 (arguing that “it is not clear that a significant num-
ber of bad actors are beyond the reach of the law”). 
 122.  The judicial consensus runs so deep that two state appellate court decisions in Cal-
ifornia created a stir when daring to challenge it; both decisions were reversed on appeal.  
See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 153–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (acknowledging 
that “no court has subjected a provider or user of an interactive computer service to notice 
liability for disseminating third-party defamatory statements over the Internet,” but that 
“most scholars” view that analysis as “flawed”), rev’d, 146 P.3d 510, 518–19 (Cal. 2006) (not-
ing that the Court of Appeal was “[s]wimming aginst the jurisprudential tide”); Grace v. 
eBay Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 198–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), dismissed by 101 P.3d 509 (Cal. 
2004); see also David A. Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case 
Study of Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 667, 679–85 (2006) (“Two . . . important de-
cisions providing some hope for the victims of cyber targeting are now before the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.”). 
 123.  See Holland, supra note 19, at 391, 395 (arguing that “narrow[ing] the grant of 
immunity [under section 230] would significantly damage the online environment,” and 
that the extension of traditional liability rules to online intermediaries may “result[] in 
overly broad restrictions on expression and behavior”). 
 124.  See Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Liability, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 293, 300–04 (2011) (stating that most intermediaries would block or limit 
content rather than develop a system to police content). 
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ing protected speech that is controversial or borderline.125  But the 
more pervasive problem is the upstream harm to generativity and in-
novation.126  If section 230 were repealed, in part or in whole, then we 
would need to reevaluate major components of the Internet, especial-
ly those surrounding user-generated content.  We could expect to lose 
much of the serendipity that makes the Internet special. 
If we do not like that prognosis, the alternative is to turn to iden-
tification measures to reinstate offline laws and norms.  The courts 
have been amenable to that approach on a case-by-case basis, issuing 
orders to assist individual victims in identifying their antagonizers as 
long as good cause is shown and due process is satisfied.127  While 
those judicial measures are helpful, they depend on the victim being 
able and willing to sue.  Even then, the measures are only partially ef-
fective, as they can be foiled by simple evasions such as the use of pub-
lic computers, shared network connections, and proxy servers.128 
                                               
 125.  See Balkin, supra note 118, at 435 (“[I]ntermediary liability produces a phenome-
non called collateral censorship: Threats of liability against party A (the conduit or online 
service provider) give them reasons to try to control or block the speech of party B (the 
online speaker).”); see also Wu, supra note 124, at 296–97, 304–09 (“The unique harm of 
collateral censorship, as opposed to self-censorship, lies in the incentives that intermediar-
ies have to suppress more speech than would be withheld by original speakers. This addi-
tional suppression occurs . . . both because original speakers obtain benefits from the 
speech not realized by intermediaries and because intermediaries face liability risks not 
borne by original speakers.”). 
 126.  See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 118, at 435–36 (“The problem with the strategy of col-
lateral censorship in the Internet context is that it leads to . . . too little innovation.”). 
 127.  See Clay Calvert et al., David Doe v. Goliath, Inc.: Judicial Ferment in 2009 for Business 
Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of Anonymous Online Speakers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 40–46 
(2009) (comparing the legal standards for unmasking an online user across four recent 
cases); Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First 
Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 421 (2003) (same with six cases); see also Cohen v. 
Google, 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2009) (“Those who suffer damages 
as a result of tortious or other actionable communications on the Internet should be able 
to seek appropriate redress by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an illusory 
shield of purported First Amendment rights.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
Amir Efrati, Subpoenas Allowed in AutoAdmit Suit, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Jan. 30, 2008, 9:08 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/30/subpoena-allowed-in-autoadmit-suit/ (re-
porting that subpoenas were issued in the AutoAdmit case for the identities of users who 
had posted allegedly defamatory remarks online). 
 128.  See COLE STRYKER, HACKING THE FUTURE: PRIVACY, IDENTITY, AND ANONYMITY ON 
THE WEB 174–84 (2012) (describing a variety of obfuscation tactics, including web-based 
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Some regulators have begun to take more proactive steps such as 
imposing “real name” requirements.  Among nations, the most visible 
efforts have come from China and South Korea,129 and in the private 
sector, from operators of social networks such as Facebook and 
Google.130  Thus far, those policies have been poorly implemented 
and inconsistently applied.131  They have also drawn heavy criticism, 
                                               
redirectors, encryption tools, proxy servers, VPN tunneling, and further measures such as 
buying a separate computer using a prepaid credit card, using prepaid phones, and using 
someone else’s Internet connection); David Margolick, Slimed Online, UPSTART BUS. J. 
(Feb. 11, 2009, 8:00 AM), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news-markets/national-
news/portfolio/2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying.html (noting that sub-
poenas in the AutoAdmit case “failed to yield much, in part because many posters had tak-
en care to send their messages from internet cafés and other public computers”). 
 129.  See Eric S. Fish, Is Internet Censorship Compatible with Democracy?: Legal Restrictions of 
Online Speech in South Korea, 10 ASIA-PACIFIC J. ON HUM. RTS & L., No. 2, 2009, at 43, 85 
(stating that the South Korean National Assembly passed “an amendment to the Law on 
Internet Address Management requiring Korean websites with over 100,000 daily visitors to 
have their users register with their real names and social security numbers”); John M. 
Leitner, To Post Or Not to Post: Korean Criminal Sanctions for Online Expression, 25 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 43, 61–64 (2011) (describing the first two years of Korea’s experience with 
the Real Name Verification System); Jonathan Ansfield, China Adds Layer of Web Surveillance 
With a Rule Seeking Users’ Names, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, at A4 (“News Web sites in China, 
complying with secret government orders, are requiring that new users log on under their 
true identities to post comments.”); Chris Buckley, Analysis: China Seeks to Tether the Mi-
croblog Tiger, REUTERS, Sept. 16, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09 
/16/us-china-internet-idUSTRE78F04D20110916 (writing that one of the ways of regulat-
ing microblogs being considered by the Chinese government was “demanding that users 
who forward messages use their real names”).  But see ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 977 F. 
Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (invalidating a state statute that criminalized any internet 
transmission that falsely identified or misrepresented the sender). 
 130.  See danah boyd, The Politics of ‘Real Names’: Power, Context, and Control in Networked 
Publics, 55 COMM. ACM 29, 29–31 (2012) (contrasting the norm among many Facebook 
users to follow the terms of service requiring “real names and information,” with Google’s 
failure to impose a similar policy). 
 131.  See, e.g., Eric Pfanner, Naming Names on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/technology/naming-names-on-the-internet. 
html (discussing the failure of South Korea’s experiment with the real-name requirement 
after hackers stole 35 million national identification numbers that were being used for val-
idation); Tini Tran, Activist Michael Anti Furious He Lost Facebook Account—While Zuckerberg’s 
Dog Has Own Page, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2011, 7:35 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/03/08/michael-anti-facebook_n_832771.html (discussing how Facebook 
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for reasons ranging from wrongful enforcement and loss of privacy, to 
physical endangerment of activists and dissidents.132  As a result, sever-
al entities have subsequently rescinded their policies while the re-
maining ones have not yet been very vigilant in their enforcement.133 
Yet, in the long run, defeating policies like real name require-
ments may be a pyrrhic victory.  The more ground we give to anonym-
ity, the more we paint ourselves into a corner where the only way to 
regulate offensive speech is to pre-emptively block the tools and plat-
forms used to produce it.  As an example, website operators have 
found that they have two main options to deal with abusive com-
ments.  One option is to impose a registration requirement that cre-
ates some degree of accountability.134  Email addresses have long been 
the dominant identifier on the Internet—a legacy of early UNIX 
computers and online service providers, which assigned only one ac-
count per user and made new accounts difficult to obtain.  But free 
webmail services spoiled that assumption years ago, reducing registra-
tion requirements into little more than a formality.135  The failure of 
                                               
canceled the account of a Chinese activist because of a “strict” policy against pseudonyms, 
yet allows Mark Zuckerberg’s dog to have its own account).   
 132.  See Alexis Madrigal, Why Facebook and Google’s Concept of ‘Real Names’ is Revolutionary, 
ATLANTIC, Aug. 5, 2011 (arguing that “[o]n the boulevards and town squares of Facebook, 
you can’t just say, ‘Down with the government,’” because “if a government or human re-
sources researcher or plain old enemy wants to get a hold of it, it is possible”); Pfanner, 
supra note 131 (citing privacy and political dissent); Tran, supra note 131 (“Dissidents in a 
variety of countries have argued that Facebook’s policy can endanger human rights activ-
ists.”).  
 133.  See, e.g., Loretta Chao, Microblogs Survive Real-Name Rules--So Far, WALL ST. J. BLOGS 
(Apr. 30, 2012, 5:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/04/30/microblogs-
survive-real-name-rules-so-far/ (observing that Chinese web users could still post messages 
on microblogs without verifying their identities despite a government-imposed deadline 
for real-name registration). 
 134.  See, e.g., Richard Pérez-Peña, News Sites Rethink Anonymous Online Comments, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, at B1 (“The New York Times, The Post and many other papers have 
moved in stages toward requiring that people register before posting comments, providing 
some information about themselves that is not shown onscreen.”) 
 135.  Interestingly, a hierarchy developed among free webmail services in which some 
were deemed more reputable than others. Gmail quickly became the gold standard upon 
its launch in 2004, in part because the addresses were highly desirable and difficult to re-
place, and because they were initially doled out via social connections.  See Juliet Chung, 
For Some Beta Testers, It’s About Buzz, Not Bugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004 (reporting that invi-
tations to use Gmail were being auctioned for prices as high as $200).  Yahoo and Hotmail 
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email-based registration forced many websites to move grudgingly in 
the other direction and restrict the commenting function itself—
whether by adding a screening process, hiding all comments by de-
fault, or disabling the function entirely.136  Only with the emergence 
of social networking sites, which have created better identifiers to re-
place the email address, has that trend reversed; a sea change is now 
under way to integrate validation through entities such as Facebook.137 
Regulating defamation involves the same tradeoff.  Reforming 
section 230 to restore intermediary liability for user-generated defa-
mation would pressure websites to adopt corresponding restrictions 
that limit their exposure to risky user behavior.138  Even confining lia-
bility to “cyber-cesspools”139—the worst of the worst—would invite def-
                                               
addresses—hardly trustworthy but too widely used to ignore—were a cut below and only 
sometimes refused as credentials, while addresses at webmail services that explicitly adver-
tised anonymizing features (such as Hushmail or Mailinator) were almost always rejected 
by community forums. 
 136.  See, e.g., Pérez-Peña, supra note 134 (“Some sites and prominent bloggers, like An-
drew Sullivan, simply do not allow comments.”). 
 137.  See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 111, at 217–19 (explaining how social intermediaries en-
able individuals to project a consistent identity across the Internet); James Rainey, On the 
Media: Your Words, Your Real Name, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/26/entertainment/la-et-onthemedia-20110226 (re-
porting that the Bay Area News Group is requiring commenters to use their Facebook 
identities); Facebook Commenting FAQ, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
story/2011-11-28/Facebook-comments-FAQ/51451552/1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (ex-
plaining new policy requiring a Facebook account with a profile photo and at least four 
friends in order to comment on stories). 
 138.  See Balkin, Free Expression, supra note 118, at 436 (“If I were liable for comments 
posted in response to my blog posts, I simply would not allow any comments. The same is 
true for online versions of newspapers and magazines which now allow readers to respond 
by posting comments.  Without section 230, many website operators would simply disable 
these features.”); David V. Richards, Note, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case 
for Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1350 (2007) (proposing a “notice-based liability” system in which Internet pro-
viders “would only be liable for defamatory or privacy-invading content of which they were 
actually aware or notified,” but noting that under such a system, providers “would likely 
not monitor users and simply remove posts called to their attention”).  
 139.  See Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH AND REPUTATION 155 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum 
eds., 2010); Danielle Citron, Revenge Porn and the Uphill Battle to Pierce Section 230 Immunity 
(Part II), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.concurring 
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initional uncertainty as to where the line should be drawn, as well as 
malicious attacks of planned vitriol at otherwise innocuous websites to 
cause mayhem.   
Or we could push regulation down the other path by adopting a 
vicarious liability regime for anonymous content.  Websites could al-
low anonymous content as long as they were willing to assume the 
risk.  Conversely, websites that adopted identity-validating measures 
could continue to support user-generated content without having to 
make difficult judgment calls about whether doing so might confer 
liability—the key benefit of section 230.  Defamation would be cur-
tailed, or at least redressable, without adverse effects on generativity. 
Another possible response is that we should simply accept the ex-
istence of defamatory speech, develop thicker skins, and forego all 
speech regulation.140  That is not the approach we have chosen for of-
fline speech, and it seems unlikely that it will be the choice we ulti-
mately make for online speech.  But, again, the purpose here is not to 
address whether or when defamation ought to be proscribed.  Rather, 
it is to offer a lens for viewing the available options once the decision 
to regulate has been made. 
Choosing to restrict anonymity does not mean we need to go as 
far as mandatory real-name policies.  “Real enough” may be good 
enough.141  Some proposals, for instance, have suggested promising 
                                               
opinions.com/archives/2013/01/revenge-porn-and-the-uphill-battle-to-pierce-section-230-
immunity-part-ii.html (advocating a narrower amendment to section 230 that would re-
voke immunity only against “websites designed to facilitate illegal conduct or [that] are 
principally used to that end”). 
 140.  See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 95 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The only sure way to protect speech and press against these threats is 
to recognize that libel laws are abridgments of speech and press and therefore are barred 
in both federal and state courts by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Anthony Ci-
olli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 137, 160–61 (2008) (arguing that “such speech, even if uncivil, unrefined, 
or even frequently wrong, is an essential component of the marketplace of ideas”). 
 141.  See, e.g., JOHN HENRY CLIPPINGER, A CROWD OF ONE 118–19 (2007) (noting that, in 
the late 1990s, eBay held fraud to less than 0.01% by creating a feedback system, and 
providing other community-building devices such as “neighborhood watch” groups and 
the Giving Board); Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonym-
ity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problem of Information Privacy in the Internet Soci-
ety, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991 (2004) (arguing that traceable pseudonymity offers the best 
compromise).   
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alternatives to the top-down model of assigning one unitary identity.142  
A federated model could offer more flexibility to create different, 
parallel identification models that fill different contextual needs. At 
the very least, we should consider the likelihood that the creation of 
some system of compulsory identifiability is (perhaps counterintuitive-
ly) the necessary first step toward preserving the “future of the Inter-
net” that Zittrain and others seek. 
III.  THE GENERATIVE COST OF ANONYMITY 
There is good reason why anonymity and generativity are key 
pressure points.  Both are tools that empower individuals to resist 
rules that ordinarily constrain behavior.  Anonymizing technologies 
allow dissenting voices to challenge existing norms and hierarchies.143  
                                               
 142.  See, e.g., KIM CAMERON, THE LAWS OF IDENTITY (2005), http://www.identity 
blog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf (describing a unifying identity 
metasystem that would allow diverse implementations and approaches to digital identity as 
long as they follow seven essential laws); Johnson, Crawford & Palfrey, supra note 108, at 15 
(2004) (recommending a decentralized “peer production” model for the Internet that 
would allow individuals to develop a trust-based system for the flow of information). 
 143.  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Man-
agement in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003–07 (1996) (arguing that “[t]houghts and 
opinions, which are the predicates to speech, cannot arise in a vacuum,” and that a right to 
read anonymously is necessary for the “iterative process of ‘speech-formation’—which de-
termines, ultimately, both the content of one’s speech and the particular viewpoint one 
espouses”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anony-
mous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1586–89 (2007) (arguing that “First Amend-
ment jurisprudence . . . clearly prefers anonymous speech to no speech at all,” because 
“governmental attempts to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox’ have resulted frequently in 
suppression of truth and enshrinement of error”); Gayle Horn, Note, Online Searches and 
Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 735, 764–67 (2005) (“[A]nonymity not only mitigates the potential for indi-
viduals to be deterred from exercising their speech or associational rights, it also is crucial 
for identity formation and social interaction.”); Alexander T. Nguyen, Note, Here’s Looking 
at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 2 ¶ 52 (2002) (collecting cases that have protected anonymity in a variety of 
different contexts); Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without 
Anonymous Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 590 (2001) (“As the Supreme Court has observed, 
anonymous expression has played an important role in the progress of mankind.”); A. Mi-
chael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well 31–33 (Sept. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Froomkin, 
Lessons Learned] (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930017 
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Likewise, generative technologies allow new innovations to break set-
tled patterns of behavior.144  The freedom to transcend such con-
straints can foment positive change and progress.  But it can also lead 
to harmful disruption and disorder.  When anonymity allows perpe-
trators to escape detection, harms go unredressed145 and the aggre-
gate incidence of harmful behavior increases.146  Generativity poses a 
similar threat—a lurking fear that at any moment irreparable damage 
could be committed in scary, unanticipated ways.147  By their very na-
ture, both anonymity and generativity are messy, and they cannot be 
channeled to show only their Sunday best. 
                                               
(stating the importance of anonymity to prevent sinister profiling by corporate and public 
hands, which can constrict the economic and political freedoms of the persons profiled). 
 144.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 79–94 (describing the benefits of generativity as “at 
least two distinct goods, one deriving from unanticipated change, and the other from in-
clusion of large and varied audiences”). 
 145.  See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymi-
ty, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 404–05 (1996) [hereinafter 
Froomkin, Flood Control] (“Sissela Bok has argued that a society in which ‘everyone can 
keep secrets impenetrable at will’ . . . would be undesirable because ‘it would force us to 
disregard the legitimate claims of those persons who might be injured, betrayed, or ig-
nored as the result of secrets inappropriately kept.’ . . . This damage to society’s ability to 
redress legitimate claims is, I believe, the strongest moral objection to the increase in 
anonymous interaction.”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 143, at 1559 (“Speakers may use the 
shield of anonymity for a variety of purposes, only some of which may be consistent with 
the public good.”); Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf Is Not Always in for a Cow: An Analysis of 
the Constitutional Right of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 527, 543–44 (2002) (discussing “[t]he concern[s] that anonymity enables fraud” and 
makes it difficult to obtain information about an individual’s actions, thus avoiding detec-
tion). 
 146.  See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, 
and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 142 [hereinafter Post, Pooling 
Intellectual Capital] (describing “the attendant moral-hazard problem: to the extent indi-
viduals can avoid internalizing the costs that their behavior imposes on others, widespread 
anonymity may increase the aggregate amount of harmful behavior itself”).  Interestingly, 
although some studies have suggested that anonymity leads to an increase in anti-social 
behavior, others claim that the results are inconclusive. See Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitch-
ing and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation and Free Expression on the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 519, 531–35 (2006). 
 147.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 96 (“Generative technologies . . . invite disruption—
along with all the good things and bad things that can come with such disruption.”). 
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The Internet amplifies those effects both in magnitude and in 
speed.148  Any new technology can be expected to spawn a period of 
increased generativity, but the Internet is unique in that it has taxed 
the limits of society’s tolerance along both axes at the same time.  As 
we intervene to regulate against online abuses, however, we must 
force ourselves to weigh carefully the costs of restricting generativity 
against the costs of restricting anonymity.  Otherwise, the Internet will 
be shaped by unintended consequences, and the path of least re-
sistance may well turn out to be an anti-generative one.  Even worse, 
we might inadvertently restrict both anonymity and generativity far 
beyond what is necessary or optimal. 
The claim that anonymity and generativity promote liberty is 
backwards.  Rather, a society that is liberal will choose to allow more 
anonymity and more generativity, while a society that is restrictive will 
choose to allow less of each.  All else equal—if we hold the desired 
level of enforcement as given and fixed—the relevant question is not 
whether generativity or anonymity can shift the balance between lib-
erty and security, but instead whether the liberties afforded by gener-
ativity should be traded for the liberties afforded by anonymity.149 
                                               
 148.  See Tien, supra note 112, at 151–54 (“Amplification has distributional consequenc-
es as well as communicative ones.  It is not merely that more hearers may be reached, but 
that hearers in different places may be reached.”); Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet 
Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True 
Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65 (2002) (describing how features 
enabled by the Internet such as widespread audiences and rapid exchange of information 
have an amplifying effect on threatening speech); Horn, supra note 143, at 772 (“Even 
more so than print or television media, the Internet acts as an amplifier.  It likely hosts a 
larger number of listeners in total as well as listeners from a larger number of places.  This 
magnifies the problems inherent in a right to anonymity . . . .”).  Metcalfe’s Law, a proposi-
tion developed to explain why individuals “needed more Ethernet boards than they were 
buying,” predicts that the power of a network grows at an exponential rate relative to the 
number of connected users.  James Hendler & Jennifer Golbeck, Metcalfe’s Law, Web 2.0, 
and the Semantic Web, 6 WEB SEMANTICS: SCI. SERVS. & AGENTS ON WORLD WIDE WEB 14, 14–
15 (2008), available at http://www.cs.umd.edu/~golbeck/downloads/Web20-SW-JWS-web 
Version.pdf (using Metcalfe’s Law to explain the network effect of the Web). 
 149.  Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1022–23 (1983) (“The fact is that if people were 
truly prohibited from interfering with the legal liberties of others, no one would be free to 
do anything.  We want people to be able to interfere in some ways with others, and we 
want to stop them from interfering in other ways.  The point is to choose, not to lull peo-
ple into believing that the problem does not exist.”). 
  
2013] THE ANONYMOUS INTERNET 541 
Those who are anonymity maximalists argue that anonymity is 
too easily compromised, and that tolerating occasional vandals is a 
small price to pay for the singular ability to resist authoritarian con-
trol.150  Some have suggested that online abuses are more tolerable 
because they involve only informational harms, not physical harms.151  
If anonymity could be revoked every time it were deemed the slightest 
bit displeasing, then it would be worse than useless.  Under that view, 
bright-line protection of anonymity is necessary to prevent gradual 
encroachments on legitimate uses of anonymity. 
Yet, anonymity does not exist in a vacuum, and protecting it will 
come at direct cost to generativity.  Some legal protection of anonymi-
ty is useful, but perfect anonymity is fool’s gold.  Escaping the con-
straints of one’s physical identity requires the aid of technology—
whether it is as simple as a Guy Fawkes mask152 or as complex as the 
Internet.  The trouble with using technology to elevate anonymity 
above the law is that it turns the enabling technology into a target.  
                                               
 150.  See, e.g., Froomkin, Lessons Learned, supra note 143.  
 151.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 97 (“One might want to allow more room for exper-
imentation in information technology . . . because the risks of harm—particularly physical 
harm—are likely to be lower as a structural matter from misuse or abuse of information 
technology.”); Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1385–86 (2008) (“Nobody has ever been killed as the result of an 
online attack. The Internet has never ‘crashed’ and never will.”).  But see Elisabeth Bumil-
ler & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
2012, at A1 (reporting comments by the U.S. Defense Secretary that the United States is 
increasingly vulnerable to a “cyber-Pearl Harbor that would cause physical destruction and 
the loss of life”); Barnaby J. Feder, Computer Security Team to Report Hacking Into Defibrillator-
Pacemaker, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at C4 (discussing how a team of computer security 
researchers managed to hack into and control a combination heart defibrillator and 
pacemaker in a way “that would potentially be fatal if the device had been in a person”); 
Nadya Labi, Are You Sure You Want to Quit the World?, GQ, Oct. 2010, at 234 (reporting on a 
middle-aged man who had been lurking in suicide chat rooms, and posing as a twenty-
something female nurse for the thrill of encouraging others to take their lives); Kim Zet-
ter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, WIRED (Ju-
ly 11, 2011, 7:00 AM),  http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-
deciphered-stuxnet/all/1 (noting that the Stuxnet worm used digital code “to physically 
destroy something in the real world”); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text . 
 152.  See Tim Murphy, The Last Laugh, 500 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at ST6 
(reporting that a mask bearing the image of Guy Fawkes, a seventeenth-century English 
folk hero, was “imbued . . . with real-life symbolism” by “the ‘hacktivist’ collective, Anony-
mous,” who “donned the masks whenever they appeared in public”). 
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Such countermeasures are effective precisely because they reduce the 
generativity of the system.  When relatively little generativity is at stake 
(as with masks), restricting use of that technology (such as through 
anti-mask laws) might have little consequence.153  But extending that 
tack to a highly generative system such as the Internet exacts a more 
severe toll.  That is not to say that all anonymity should be sacrificed 
in order to maximize generativity. Rather, the danger is the oppo-
site—that perfecting anonymity will quash too much generativity. 
A.  Dog Days of Anonymity 
“On the Internet,” goes the infamous quip, “nobody knows 
you’re a dog.”154  It is a tongue-in-cheek statement, but it embodies a 
common perception that anonymity is a binary on/off switch—either 
your real identity is known or it is not.  Of course, that is not quite 
right; we share our identity with some parties while seeking to remain 
anonymous vis-à-vis everyone else.155  A better depiction of anonymity 
is as a curtain that we draw between our confidants and distrusted 
outsiders.156  We remain effectively anonymous to those outsiders as 
long as the curtain remains intact, though anyone within its curtilage 
has the ability to welcome others inside. 
Thus, the security of an anonymous interaction is governed by 
two factors: (1) the number of confidants, and (2) the strength of se-
crecy to which they are bound.  What some scholars have termed “un-
                                               
 153.  For a contrasting view and a comprehensive survey of judicial treatment of anti-
mask laws, see Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Comparing State Anti-
Mask Laws to the Doe Anonymous Online Speech Standard, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
 154.  See Glenn Fleishman, Cartoon Captures Spirit of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/technology/cartoon-captures-
spirit-of-the-internet.html (tracing the influence and popularity of the caption, which orig-
inated in a New Yorker cartoon). 
 155.  Cf. Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in 
Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 20, 21 (2008) (“In technologically 
mediated sociality, being seen by those we wish to be seen by, in ways we wish to be seen, and 
thereby engaging in identity expression, communication and impression management are 
central motivations.”). 
 156.  See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2202 (1996) 
(“[A]nonymity is an accepted social practice not when it is complete but rather when there 
is anonymity as to some recipients or subjects but identifiability to a responsible interme-
diary.”). 
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traceable anonymity” is simply the edge case where there are no 
known confidants.157  “Traceable” anonymity, on the other hand, re-
fers to cases in which the confidants are already known and the only 
remaining variable is their discretion,158 which can then be swayed by 
external forces such as legal penalties, group norms, and economic 
incentives.159 
As a practical matter, it has become clear over the past decade 
that most Internet users are identifiable if sufficient need is demon-
strated.  Mechanisms exist, or have been put in place, that can be in-
                                               
 157.  See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 145, at 416–24 (defining “untraceable ano-
nymity” as “a communication for which the author is simply not identifiable at all”); John 
Alan Farmer, Note, The Specter of Crypto-Anarchy: Regulating Anonymity-Protecting Peer-to-Peer 
Networks, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 725, 745–46 (2003) (describing untraceable anonymity in 
similar terms).   
 158.  See Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1031–32 (“Traceable pseudonymity enables a two-way 
link between the pseudonym and the physical self by allowing the individual to directly 
and discreetly receive messages intended for the alias.”).  Froomkin describes the follow-
ing situation as an example of traceable electronic anonymity: “A remailer that gives the 
recipient no clues as to the sender’s identity, but leaves this information in the hands of a 
single intermediary.”  Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 145, at 417; see also Farmer, supra 
note 157, at 151 (“[T]he traceability of a message may be largely a function of the re-
mailer’s duty (or lack of a duty) to keep the information secret . . . .”). 
 159.  David Post adds nuance to Froomkin’s basic framework by defining traceability as 
the ease with which additional identifying information can be obtained, not simply wheth-
er it can be obtained at all.  Post further notes that “the cost of obtaining a given amount 
of additional identification information will vary, possibly greatly, from one situation to 
another.”  See Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital, supra note 146, at 150–51; see also Reno v. 
Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143, 151 (2000) (upholding the constitutionality of the Driver’s 
Protection Privacy Act, which “regulates the disclosure and resale” of drivers’ personal in-
formation by state motor vehicle departments); Russell Dean Covey, Beating the Prisoner at 
Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Evidentiary Value of a Witness’s Refusal to Testify, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 105, 
129–32 (1997) (analyzing a witness’s choice to invoke the Fifth Amendment and suggest-
ing that “[t]he force of the code of silence, or omerta, may spring from internal assimila-
tion of a set of values adverse to the duties imposed by the criminal justice system”); 
Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1040–41 (“To maintain a traceable pseudonymous environment, 
the two walls described above—the walls (1) between the various identities and the physi-
cal persona, and (2) among the various identities themselves—must remain intact.  The 
strength of these walls, however, will be constantly tested.”); Farmer, supra note 157, at 151 
(noting that the traceability of a message is influenced by “the ease with which disclosure 
can be legally compelled (by process, subpoena, warrant, or otherwise)”). 
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voked to pierce the veil of anonymity.160  Nevertheless, online ano-
nymity remains relevant for at least three reasons.  First, there is an 
overwhelming perception of anonymity among Internet users, which 
continues to shape their online conduct.161  Second, the functional 
reality of anonymity is that it remains too burdensome to pursue iden-
tification in most cases, especially for ordinary citizens.162  Third, there 
is an aspirational goal of anonymity, especially among technologists 
and policy advocates who remain committed to the task of building 
more perfect anonymizing tools for the Internet.163 
Many justifications have been offered in defense of anonymity, 
but they can be organized around three major themes: privacy, partic-
ipation, and truth.  Together, they form an engine of change that in-
cubates and nurtures ideas from private inception to public adoption.  
As we will see later, those three themes mirror parallel attributes of 
generativity. 
For most of us, of course, being anonymous is not about chang-
ing the world.  All we want is shelter from prying eyes to conduct our 
personal business.  The term “privacy” encompasses many concepts,164 
                                               
 160.  See, e.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006) (enacting provi-
sions for the “[r]equired disclosure of customer communications or records”); Council 
Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105/54) (EC) (relating to “the retention of data gen-
erated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic com-
munications services or of public communications networks”); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 
775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (offering judicial guidelines for 
unmasking a “John Doe” defendant). 
 161.  See Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Pro-
tections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 835 (2010) (noting that people “feel anonymous 
amidst the millions of [other] users”). 
 162.  See, e.g., Margolick, supra note 128. 
 163.  See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Using His Software Skills with Freedom, Not a Big Payout, in Mind, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, at A20 (reporting on the development of Cryptocat, a tool that 
allows up to ten people to speak privately to one another in encrypted chat rooms); James 
Glanz & John Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 
2011, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. State Department has been funding the development 
of anonymizing software); see also STRYKER, supra note 128, at 174–84 (explaining that it is 
possible to remain totally anonymous on the Internet, “but it’s very hard”).  But see Paul 
Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1, 18–20 (2008) (praising the 
“struggle” for perfection, though not the achievement of perfection, as a valuable way to 
balance the interests between transparency and privacy). 
 164.  See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (“[P]rivacy is a 
sweeping concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over 
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but the one most often associated with “anonymity” is the desire to 
protect one’s reputation and well-being in one context from the con-
sequences of one’s actions in another context.165  By providing that 
separation, anonymity creates a permissive environment that allows 
for greater incubation of thought and experimentation with ideolo-
gies and practices diverging from what is perceived to be the accepta-
ble norm.166  With an anonymous Internet, we can be bolder in 
searching the Web for sensitive information or keeping an online dia-
ry, because anonymity constructs a barrier that prevents those “pri-
vate” acts from being linked back to our identities.167 
                                               
one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over personal information, freedom from sur-
veillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and interroga-
tions); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 67 (2010) (noting that “privacy is a messy and complex subject” 
and that “[t]he landscape of theoretical work on privacy is vast, spanning disciplines from 
philosophy to political science”). 
 165.  See Cohen, supra note 143, at 1038–39 (arguing that “reading is so intimately con-
nected with speech, and so expressive in its own right, that the freedom to read anony-
mously must be considered a right that the First Amendment protects”); Horn, supra note 
143, at 765 (“[A] right to anonymity ensures that an individual will have control over how 
he or she chooses to reveal him or herself, and control over the circumstances in which his 
or her speech is given.”); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY 
L.J. 869, 876 (1996) (“Anonymity refers to the power to control whether people know who 
you are; it is a tool of privacy.”).  But see Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 143, at 1568–70 (sug-
gesting an intrinsic rationale, deriving “internal satisfaction from not having their true 
identity revealed”). 
 166.  See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000) (writing that a “realm of autonomous, unmonitored 
choice” permits experimentation “with beliefs and associations, [as well as] with every oth-
er conceivable type of taste and behavior that expresses and defines self”); Neil Richards, 
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008) (articulating a normative theory of “in-
tellectual privacy” that protects “the ability . . . to develop ideas and beliefs away from the 
unwanted gaze or interference of others”); Zarsky, supra note 141, at 999 (noting that pri-
vacy scholars have criticized constant monitoring as an intrusion on privacy because moni-
toring “inhibits daily activities, promotes conformity, causes embarrassment, and interferes 
with the creation of intimacy”); see also Jane: An Abortion Service, FEMINIST WOMEN’S HEALTH 
CTR., http://www.fwhc.org/jane.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (describing JANE, an 
anonymous abortion service founded in Chicago in the late 1960s that provided “over 
12,000 safe, affordable abortions” until it was disbanded after Roe v. Wade).  
 167.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 143, at 1010 (“The right to read anonymously . . . is 
predicated on the likely chilling effect that exposure of a reader’s tastes would have on 
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Yet, “anonymity” implies much more than just private self-
discovery.  The most highly touted uses of anonymity—such as the 
Federalist papers,168 speech by persecuted groups,169 or whistleblow-
ing170—are instances of public advocacy and civic action.  The classic 
invocation of anonymity is as an act of public participation, not seclu-
sion, and is usually used to convey an unpopular or controversial 
idea.171  In other words, privacy focuses inward and seeks to keep the 
                                               
expressive conduct, broadly understood—not only speech itself, but also the information-
gathering activities that precede speech.”); Zarsky, supra note 141, at 1038–39 (“With 
pseudonymity, . . . users can get a taste of different cultures and ideas, while reserving their 
ability to switch back to their real life unnoticed. . . .  [W]hen a user grows tired of a specif-
ic virtual personality, or is unhappy with the feedback it generates, he or she can simply set 
it aside, and move on . . . .”); Douglas Quenqua, Recklessly Seeking Sex on Craigslist, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at A1 (describing the “Casual Encounters” section of Craigslist as “al-
low[ing] for a wide range of personal meeting and relationship options,” and “an accurate 
inside look at how people like to connect these days”).  Evidence of that boldness is some-
times put on prominent display when anonymity is unexpectedly breached.  See Christo-
pher Soghoian, The Problem of Anonymous Vanity Searches, 3 I/S J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 299 
(2007) (describing how a murder suspect had searched for the words “neck,” “snap,” and 
“break” before allegedly killing his wife); Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face Is Ex-
posed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1 (discussing how an AOL 
user was identified by her Internet searches, which included multiple queries for medical 
conditions ranging from “numb fingers,” to “dry mouth,” to “bipolar”); April Witt, Blog 
Interrupted, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2004, at W12 (detailing the “Washingtonienne” scandal 
involving an anonymous online sex diary that was outed); see also Paul Ohm, Broken Promis-
es of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 
1704 (2010) (explaining reidentification science and the flaws of anonymizing tech-
niques); About 33 Bits, 33 BITS OF ENTROPY, http://33bits.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2013) (noting that with “only 6.6 billion people in the world, [we] only need 33 bits . . . of 
information about a person to determine who they are”).  
 168.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360–69 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (recounting the extensive use of anonymous political expression in early 
American history). 
 169.  See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)  (“It is hardly a 
novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy 
may constitute a[n] effective . . . restraint on freedom of association . . . .  This Court has 
recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associ-
ations.”). 
 170.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (2006). 
 171.  See, e.g., Melissa Bell & Elizabeth Flock, Sometimes You Want to Go Where Nobody 
Knows Your Name, WASH. POST, June 19, 2011, at B3 (“Anonymity has allowed bloggers in 
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world “out,” while anonymity focuses outward and prevents the world 
from keeping ideas “in.”  The very reason to invoke anonymity—
rather than privacy—is to avoid repercussions for ideas or acts that 
one feels compelled to thrust into the public consciousness despite 
knowing that they may be unpopular.172  Because of that reassurance, 
more ideas can be shared, and more people can safely signal approval 
or disapproval of those ideas.173 
One school of thought holds that democratic governance is ad-
vanced whenever more people have more opportunities to participate 
in the process and have their say—regardless of what is actually said.174  
                                               
the Middle East to safely tell the world what is happening in their countries during the Ar-
ab Spring. Anonymity allows everyone online . . . a creativity and a breadth of discussion 
that might not occur if a name had to be attached.”).  
 172.  See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2823 (2010) (Alito J., concurring) (“The 
widespread harassment and intimidation suffered by supporters of California’s Proposition 
8 provides strong support for an as-applied exemption [from disclosure of the identities of 
petition signers] in the present case.”).  But see id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“Disclosure of the identity of petition signers . . . in no way directly impairs the ability of 
anyone to speak and associate for political ends either publicly or privately.”). 
 173.  See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 143, at 1573 (“[A]nonymity encourages contribu-
tions to the marketplace of ideas by eliminating barriers both to speaking (such as age, 
social status, or ethnicity) and to listening (such as fear of social censure or geographical 
isolation).”); Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital, supra note 146, at 143 (“By permitting indi-
viduals to communicate without fear of compromising their personal privacy and without 
fear of retribution, anonymity permits information to be injected into public discourse 
that might otherwise remain undisclosed.”); Sandeen, supra note 145, at 541–42 (“The 
main benefit of anonymity, at least based upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Talley 
and its progeny, is its potential role in promoting unfettered speech.”); Horn, supra note 
143, at 765–66 (“If an individual is forced to disclose his or her identity, he or she may be 
deterred from speaking.  However, while the chilling effect is largely concerned with what 
government action will be taken in response to a particular speech, anonymity is con-
cerned with the way the speech will be received by an audience generally, irrespective of 
governmental reprisal.”).  
 174.  See Cohen, supra note 143, at 1007 (“To object that comparatively few people con-
duct in-depth research before sharing their views on a particular topic is to miss the 
point.”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 
DUKE L.J. 855, 893–904 (2000) (discussing the ways in which online anonymity tests the 
high theory of the First Amendment); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 143, at 1573–74 
(“[A]nonymous speech promotes democratic self-governance . . . .  The inclusion of voices 
in public debate that might not otherwise be heard, particularly the voices of those with 
less power and influence, makes public discourse and ultimately our system of government 
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Under that reasoning, anonymous comments are always defensible in 
public discourse, no matter how vile, and the best defense is to fight 
speech with more speech.175  The pure expansion in ability to speak 
and participate is more important than judging the quality of dis-
course that is thereby gained.176 
                                               
more democratic.”); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 
484-85 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory Democracy] (“It is this [equal autonomy of 
speakers] that underwrites the First Amendment doctrine’s refusal to distinguish between 
good and bad ideas, true or false ideas, or harmful or beneficial ideas.  The equality of sta-
tus of ideas within public discourse follows directly from the equality of political status of 
citizens who attempt to make the government responsive to their views.  Outside public 
discourse, by contrast, the state typically distinguishes true from false ideas, as when physi-
cians or lawyers are held liable for false or misleading opinions.”); see also CHRIS 
ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 62–
65 (2006) (discussing the democratization of the tools of production and noting that 
“[t]oday, millions of ordinary people have the tools and the role models to become ama-
teur producers,” which makes “the talented and visionary ones . . . a force to be reckoned 
with”).  But see Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2836 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The long history of public 
legislating and voting contradicts plaintiffs’ claim that disclosure of petition signatures hav-
ing legislative effect violates the First Amendment.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 
2.0, at 137 (2007) (“[A] system of limitless individual choices with respect to communica-
tions is not necessarily in the interest of citizenship and self-government.”); Malcolm 
Gladwell, Small Change, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010 (criticizing social media activism as be-
ing ineffective because it is built on “weak ties”). 
 175.  See Ciolli, supra note 140, at 160–61 (“The Internet, though contributing to an in-
creased amount of speech of lower relative value, makes ‘public discourse more democrat-
ic and inclusive’ and ‘less subject to the control of powerful speakers’ by ‘eliminating 
structural and financial barriers to meaningful public discourse.’”); cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their 
social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” (citation omitted)). 
 176.  See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 626–33 
(1990) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse] (exploring the theoretical justification for allow-
ing outrageous speech within public discourse, despite the inherent tensions with com-
munity norms and rules of civility); see also Charles Fried, Speech in the Welfare State: The New 
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (argu-
ing that “[f]reedom of expression is properly based on [Kantian] autonomy,” and that 
“[o]ur ability to deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those con-
clusions is the foundation of our status as free and rational persons”). 
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The more mainstream view, however, holds that the purpose of 
public discourse is to seek “truth.”177  Under that view, anonymity is 
valuable because it galvanizes the vocalization of fringe views, allowing 
them opportunities to become accepted as truth and evolve into 
dogma.  It is often asserted that the best path to truth is to allow 
speech to compete freely in the “marketplace” of ideas.178  Anonymity 
can serve that function in two ways.  First, in a macroeconomic sense, 
it can expand the size of the market by stimulating the production of 
additional speech that otherwise would have been chilled.179  
“Thought that is not offered cannot get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market.”180  That rationale can be used to justify legal pro-
tections for whistleblowers,181 as well as extralegal operations such as 
Tor182 and WikiLeaks.183  Second, in a microeconomic sense, an indi-
vidual idea can become more competitive within the existing market 
when identifying information is withheld, because readers are forced 
to judge the idea on its merits without being biased by the identity or 
background of the author.184  A law student can satirize the legal in-
                                               
 177.  Cf. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 423–25 (1996) (summarizing two approaches 
to the First Amendment: “one focuse[d] on expanding the expressive opportunities open 
to speakers,” and “another focuse[d] on improving the sphere of discourse encountered 
by the public ‘audience’”). 
 178.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market . . . .”). 
 179.  See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 180.  Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 
70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1111–12 (1961). 
 181.  See 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (2006) (noting that the identity of whistleblowers may not 
be disclosed unless “necessary because of an imminent danger to public health or safety or 
imminent violation of any criminal law”); Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital, supra note 146, at 
143 (noting that anonymity enables “‘whistleblower’ information that may help uncover 
the existence of illegal activity” to enter the public discourse and that without the protec-
tions of anonymity, the information may not be made public) . 
 182.  See Eric J. Stieglitz, Note, Anonymity on the Internet: How Does It Work, Who Needs It, 
and What Are Its Policy Implications?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1395, 1402–03 (2007). 
 183.  See generally Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the 
Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011). 
 184.  See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 145, at 409 (“Communications that give no 
hint of the age, sex, race, or national origin of the writer must be judged solely on their 
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dustry by masquerading as a world-weary law firm partner;185 a political 
campaign can covertly distribute “viral” videos that undermine oppos-
ing candidates without having it be discounted as propaganda.186 
To be sure, many scholars have rightly questioned the authentici-
ty of the “truth” delivered by anonymity.187  They suggest that infor-
mation is often more reliable when the speaker’s identity and credi-
bility are verifiable,188 and that anonymity has been used to spread 
                                               
content as there is literally nothing else to go by.  This makes bigotry and stereotyping very 
difficult, and also should tend to encourage discussions that concentrate on the merits of 
the speech rather than the presumed qualities of the speakers.”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra 
note 143, at 1577 (stating that, in some cases, withholding the speaker’s identity “may pro-
tect the public against underestimating the truth-value of the statement”); Post, Public Dis-
course, supra note 176, at 640 n.213 (describing the principle that withholding the identity 
of an author can allow “impartial evaluation” of the contents of the author’s speech rather 
than a reflection of the author’s status). 
 185.  See Sara Rimer, Revealing the Soul of a Soulless Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, 
(telling the behind-the-scenes story of the blog “Anonymous Lawyer”). 
 186.  See Daniel Kreiss, Acting in the Public Sphere: The 2008 Obama Campaign’s Strategic Use 
of New Media to Shape Narratives of the Presidential Race, 33 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS CONFLICTS 
& CHANGE 195, 210–11 (2012) (describing the use of such tactics by the 2008 Obama cam-
paign). 
 187.  See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 143, at 1581–89 (“[I]f truth . . . is to emerge from 
the marketplace of ideas, the consumers of ideas must be capable of exercising their criti-
cal faculties to separate the wheat from the chaff . . . .”); Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and 
Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POLITICS 641, 644-46 (2012) (noting the distinction between “a speak-
er’s interest in keeping her identity secret because she is vulnerable to abuse by power 
from a speaker’s interest in keeping her identity secret to better wield her own power to 
shape others’ choices”); Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 174, at 487 (“The purpose 
of fostering a marketplace of ideas is an implausible goal of First Amendment doctrine be-
cause new knowledge cannot be created without the concomitant power to judge ideas as 
true or false, as better or worse."); Comment, supra note 180, at 1116 (“The assertion that 
free discussion will lead to truth is unverifiable.  In order to judge whether progress toward 
truth has been made it is necessary to know what is true.”).  That said, facts (as opposed to 
ideas) can be self-verifying. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1095, 1120–21 (2005) (“If we know that hundreds of security experts from many insti-
tutions have been able to discuss potential problems in some security system, that journal-
ists are free to follow and report on these debates, and that the experts and the press seem 
confident that no serious problems have been found, then we can be relatively confident 
that the system is sound.”). 
 188.  See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 145, at 402–03 (summarizing arguments by 
other scholars that anonymity is inefficient because it makes it more difficult to identify 
  
2013] THE ANONYMOUS INTERNET 551 
false information about everything from financial stocks189 to dating 
relationships.190  Yet, perhaps the salient point here is “truthiness,” not 
“truth.”  When anonymity spurs changes in public opinion, the 
strength of conviction in those changes may matter more than actual 
validity.191 
                                               
self-interest or bias and shifts the costs of that information acquisition onto those who are 
not the least-cost avoiders); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 143, at 1559–63 (“Anonymous 
speech persists despite the fact that it is, on average, less valuable than nonanonymous 
speech to speech consumers (audiences) who often use speaker identity as an indication 
of a work’s likely truthfulness, artistic value, or intellectual merit.  Without attribution, au-
diences must necessarily rely upon other indicia, which can be less reliable than speaker 
identity.”); Comment, supra note 180, at 1111 (“Anonymous propaganda makes it more 
difficult to identify the self interest or bias underlying an argument or the qualifications of 
its exponent. . . .  It is therefore argued that exposure of the source of propaganda will ad-
vance the search for truth by permitting a more critical evaluation of facts, figures, and 
arguments presented.”); see also I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 
U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1049 (1994) (discounting the harmful effect of anonymous defama-
tion on the grounds that “anonymous remarks will be greatly devalued precisely because 
they are anonymous and easy to make”). 
 189.  See, e.g., Michael Lewis, Jonathan Lebed’s Extracurricular Activities, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Feb. 25, 2001 (reporting on the story of Jonathan Lebed, a teenager from New Jersey, who 
was “the first minor ever to face proceedings for stock-market fraud” after he anonymously 
“posted hundreds of messages on Yahoo Finance message boards recommending . . . stock 
to others”). 
 190.  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–22 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that a computer match-making service was immune from liability under sec-
tion 230 of the CDA “for false content in a dating profile provided by someone posing as 
another person”); Lizette Alvarez, (Name Here) Is a Liar and a Cheat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2006, at G1 (highlighting various dating websites such as DontDateHimGirl.com and 
TrueDater.com that allow women to write anonymous, unverified stories identifying men 
they dated); see also Nadya Labi, An IM Infatuation Turned to Romance. Then the Truth Came 
Out, WIRED, Aug. 21, 2007 (recounting the story of a middle-aged man who created a fake 
online dating profile and, after becoming involved with a middle-aged woman posing as 
her eighteen-year-old daughter, allegedly murdered another man with whom the woman 
was also having an online relationship). 
 191.  See Comment, supra note 180, at 1123 (arguing that anonymity should be promot-
ed to “bring about a general climate in which modification [of beliefs] is most likely to be 
encouraged”); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy and the Death of Knowledge, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1053, 1056–69 (2007) (observing that “democratization of knowledge” can lead to the 
“death of knowledge”); see also JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 48–
50, 55–64, 122–23 (2010) (criticizing the “wisdom of crowds” and the “disdain for the idea 
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B.  Horse Trading for Generativity 
Zittrain’s theory of generativity unfolds along much the same tra-
jectory.  Zittrain defines generativity as consisting of five factors: 
(1) how extensively a system or technology leverages a set of 
possible tasks;  
(2) how well it can be adapted to a range of tasks;  
(3) how easily new contributors can master it;  
(4) how accessible it is to those ready and able to build on it; 
and  
(5) how transferable any changes are to others—including 
(and perhaps especially) nonexperts.192 
In other words, a system is generative when it allows individuals to re-
purpose its functionality toward new uses, and then share those inno-
vations with others. 
Those five features map loosely onto the attributes of anonymity.  
Anonymity incubates ideas that deviate from standard norms (priva-
cy), expands the pool of individuals able to articulate those ideas in 
public (participation), and assists those ideas in achieving widespread 
adoption (truth).  Similarly, generativity allows deviations from in-
tended uses (leverage, adaptability), empowers more users to perform 
that tinkering (accessibility, ease of use), and facilitates easy distribu-
tion of new uses to new users (transferability).  A reduction in any of 
those attributes stunts the system’s potential to generate progress 
through disruptive churn.193 
Like anonymity, generativity increases entropy by championing a 
bottom-up model of development, in which many ideas can be pur-
sued independently, over a top-down model, in which a few gatekeep-
ers control all the cards.194  Zittrain offers two supporting narratives: 
                                               
of quality within the culture of web 2.0 enthusiasts,” and arguing that “quantity can over-
whelm quality in human expression”); Rebecca Wexler, Integrity vs. Authenticity in Video 
Journalism, CPJ JOURNALIST SEC. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012, 2:20 PM), https://www.cpj.org/ 
security/2012/12/integrity-vs-authenticity-in-video-journalism.php (describing heated 
controversy over the authenticity of a video allegedly showing Sri Lankan soldiers execut-
ing Tamil Tiger rebels).  
 192.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 71. 
 193.  See id. at 96 (“Generative technologies need not produce forward progress, if by 
progress one means something like increasing social welfare. Rather, they foment 
change.”). 
 194.  See id. at 93 (“In hierarchies, gatekeepers control the allocation of attention and 
resources to an idea.  In polyarchies, many ideas can be pursued independently.”); cf. Jon-
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innovation and participation.  The innovation rationale is that by al-
lowing amateurs to solve their own idiosyncratic needs, generative sys-
tems fill a crucial gap that otherwise would go unfulfilled by the “firm-
mediated market model.”195  Generativity does not replace the top-
down model of research and development, but serves as a supplemen-
tary source of do-it-yourself invention.196  Likewise, the participation 
rationale is that generative systems provide citizens with more oppor-
tunities to participate actively in the creation of “cultural meaning,” 
rather than be “passive consumers” of culture produced by others.197  
Again, the point is not to replace the content created by mainstream 
media, but instead to add more citizen-produced content.198 
That latitude also means generativity represents an immunity 
from regulation very nearly like that which is provided by anonymity.  
“[S]o long as the endpoints [of a network] remain generative,” Zittrain 
writes, “subversively minded techies can make applications that offer a 
way around network blocks.”199 
Curiously, after developing that story of unruliness, Zittrain 
downplays it and turns instead to building the argument that genera-
tivity promotes better security.200  Perhaps he sees that strategy as the 
best hope of persuading security-minded regulators to leave generativ-
ity alone.201  But that vision—that generativity can simultaneously ad-
                                               
athan Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2768 (2010) [hereinafter 
Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant] (“The term ‘hierarchy’ . . . connotes a system for which there 
is no alternative, either because it does not exist, because it would be too costly, or because 
law precludes it. . . .  Polyarchy is defined by choice. . . .  [C]hoice is the ability to choose 
among various regimes or systems in which you might exist.”). 
 195.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 80–90 (“Generativity-enabled activity by amateurs can 
lead to results that would not have been produced in a firm-mediated market model.”). 
 196.  Id. at 86–90. 
 197.  Id. at 90–94. 
 198.  See id. at 93 (explaining that “more people [can] have a hand at contributing to 
the system, regardless of the quality of the contribution”). 
 199.  Id. at 105–06. 
 200.  See id. at 125–48 (explaining how “some enterprises that are generative at the con-
tent level have managed to remain productive without requiring extensive lockdown or 
external regulation” and arguing that “those lessons [can be applied] to the future of the 
Internet”). 
 201.  Cf. Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note 7, at 931–32 (“[Zittrain] actually recom-
mends very little in the way of legal intervention. . . .  The very spirit of verkeersbordvrij 
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vance liberty and security—is an illusion that depends on the prover-
bial “bad man” being won over by the goodness of humanity.202  The 
gist of Zittrain’s argument is not that generativity improves enforce-
ment, but instead the familiar libertarian hope that the elimination of 
odious rules will obviate the need for intentional rule-breaking—and 
thus the need for any enforcement at all.203  The catch, however, is 
that no matter how reasonable a rule may seem to the larger commu-
nity, rational minds can differ, and generativity qua liberty allows any 
single “subversively minded techie” to collapse the illusion of security. 
Zittrain’s anecdotal examples of communitarian success—a 
Dutch town’s experiment to improve traffic safety by removing all 
traffic signs204 and Wikipedia, a free online encyclopedia that allows 
any visitor to edit its articles205—are easily distinguished and refuted.  
In the Dutch example, the town was small enough that the pre-
existing harm from potential accidents was minimal, and never mali-
cious, such that installing a roundabout was enough to nudge driver 
behavior and reduce accidents.206  As for Wikipedia, the communitari-
                                               
[Dutch for “free of traffic signs”], it might seem, precludes more ambitious regulatory in-
terventions.”). 
 202.  David Post hints at that over-optimism, characterizing Zittrain’s agenda as a “de-
cidedly eighteenth-century program” that seeks to construct a society having “civic virtue.”  
Post, The Theory of Generativity, supra note 7, at 2764. 
 203.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 128 (“When we face heavy regulation, we see and shape 
our behavior more in relation to reward and punishment by an arbitrary external authori-
ty, than because of a commitment to the kind of world our actions can help bring about.”); 
cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 511 (1996) 
(“Early cyberspace—by which I mean the Internet as it functioned before the mass influx 
of new users and commercial hopefuls—was closer to the world the critics of intellectual 
property would like to see. . . . Cooperative creation was prevalent, and a collective creativi-
ty was recognized and celebrated.”). 
 204.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 127–30. 
 205.  Id. at 131–48. 
 206.  Zittrain highlights the success of a traffic experiment conducted by the Dutch 
town of Drachten that improved safety by counterintuitively removing nearly all road signs.  
Id. at 127.  Prior to the experiment, however, that town had been experiencing an average 
of only nine accidents a year, none of which had been fatal.  NOORDELIJKE HOGESCHOOL 
LEEUWARDEN, THE LAWEIPLEIN: EVALUATION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION INTO A SQUARE 
WITH ROUNDABOUT 5, 26–27 (2007), available at http://www.fietsberaad.nl/library/ 
repository/bestanden/Evaluation%20Laweiplein.pdf (noting eighty-three accidents be-
tween 1994 and 2002).  Drachten did not rely simply on good will; it also converted the 
Laweiplein intersection into a roundabout, a traffic structure that functions inherently well 
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an aspects have survived only because an authoritarian bureaucracy 
has been installed to impose order as needed.207 
Many other examples exist in which group norms fail to check 
generative mischief.  Splintering can be expected within any large, 
dispersed community that has enough generative ability to go around.  
In networked multiplayer games, easily installed cheats allow an indi-
vidual player to enjoy temporary dominance over others—a selfish 
thrill that persists despite strong indignation from other players.208  
Inevitably, the remedies involve a combination of efforts by game de-
signers to disable such exploits, and the use of identifiers so that 
cheaters can be censured or permanently banned.209  Likewise, it was 
unsurprising when LulzSec broke off from the larger hacker group 
Anonymous.210  The members of LulzSec became interested in gain-
ing publicity by committing more conspicuous “ops,” and they were 
successful in doing so despite efforts by other members of Anony-
                                               
without signs. Id. at 5; see also FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., DEP’T TRANSP., ROUNDABOUTS 4 
(2010) (“Numerous studies have shown significant safety improvements at intersections 
converted from conventional forms to roundabouts.”); cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) 
(describing the powerful influence of default settings on human behavior).   
 207.  See Kahn, supra note 111, at 199–201 (describing Wikipedia’s governance as “not 
purely bottom-up,” because “a handful of [appointed] ‘bureaucrats’ . . . possess authority 
above all other users”); see also Daniel Kreiss, Megan Finn & Fred Turner, The Limits of Peer 
Production: Some Reminders from Max Weber for the Network Society, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 243, 
243–245, 255 (2011) (advocating the virtues of bureaucratic governance within systems of 
peer production). 
 208.  See Steven Daniel Webb & Seiteng Soh, Cheating in Networked Games—A Review 105–
12 (Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Digital Interactive Media in En-
tertainment and Arts, Sept. 19–21, 2007) available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
summary?doi=10.1.1.83.9005 (highlighting the various methods of cheating in networked 
games and arguing that such actions “degrade[] the experience” for other players). 
 209.  See, e.g., id. at 110–11 (describing “protocols [that] have been proposed to prevent 
cheating”); Joel Zetterström, A Legal Analysis of Cheating in Online Multiplayer Games 71 
(Mar. 2005) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Göteborg University), available at https://gupea. 
ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/1948/1/200528.pdf (“Anti-cheating efforts focus on eliminating 
that anonymity, so that caught cheaters can be identified and banned.”). 
 210.  For background information on Anonymous, see generally STRYKER, supra note 
128, at 35–70; Quinn Norton, Anonymous 101: Introduction to the Lulz, WIRED (Nov. 8, 2011, 
5:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/anonymous-101/all/1. 
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mous to dissuade and shame them.211  Ultimately, LulzSec’s attacks 
were stopped not because of loyalty to the community’s ideals and 
norms, but because the members were exposed and caught.212 
More problematically, by claiming that generativity can increase 
security, Zittrain avoids having to grapple with the dilemma of how to 
choose regulations that do the least harm to generativity.  Instead, his 
main policy recommendation is to increase generativity on the ra-
tionale that security is best improved when restrictions come from the 
community, bottom up, rather than from authoritarian leaders, top 
down.213  Zittrain argues that generativity equips communities with 
better tools and capabilities to build walls and other mechanisms to 
self-police their collective norms.214  Yet those tools and capabilities al-
                                               
 211.  See Ravi Somaiya & Steve Lohr, British Police Charge Teenager in Connection With 
Hacking Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at B1 (“The two hacker groups [Anonymous 
and a splinter group, LulzSec] certainly strike different poses.  LulzSec’s statements and its 
actions display a spirit of exuberant anarchic glee.  Lulz, in essence, means mean-spirited 
laughter . . . .  There seems to be far less glee in the Anonymous culture.  In a YouTube 
video describing the group, a voice intones . . . that Anonymous’s actions have ‘brought 
justice to our world.’”); Eric Mack, Hacker Civil War Heats Up, PCWORLD (June 24, 2011, 
7:13 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/231078/hacker_civil_war_heats_up.html 
(discussing the ongoing battle between hacker groups, particularly the “emerging hacker 
insurgency” against LulzSec, which “could be motivated by a sincere sense of retribution--
to teach Lulzsec a lesson for ‘going too far’”); see also Kim Zetter, Researchers: Anonymous 
and LulzSec Need to Focus Their Chaos, WIRED (Aug. 6, 2011, 10:44 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/defcon-anonymous-panel/ (reporting on the 
views of computer security experts that “[t]he loosely affiliated groups” of “Anonymous 
and LulzSec are weakening their cause with scattershot attacks and need to get more intel-
ligent and focused” because they do “not hav[e] real goals [other than] simply wanting ‘to 
smash things’”). 
 212.  See Somini Sengupta, Arrests Sow Mistrust Inside a Clan of Hackers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
7, 2012, at A1. 
 213.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 150–52 (suggesting that saving the generative spirit 
of the Internet will require finding ways to encourage more generative participation at the 
technical layers, as has been done at the social layer, to tap the power of groups to distin-
guish good code from bad code). 
 214.  Id. at 129 (“When people can come to take the welfare of one another seriously 
and possess the tools to readily assist and limit each other, even the most precise and well-
enforced rule from a traditional public source may be less effective than that uncompelled 
goodwill.”); see also Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant, supra note 194, at 2770, 2777–81 (suggest-
ing that communitarian concepts, which are “supposed to embody participation in a much 
richer way,” provide the solution for managing cyber-security regulation because they 
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so allow subversive elements to build the same walls and mechanisms 
to evade a community’s policing efforts.  At bottom, Zittrain’s pro-
posal is an endorsement of self-regulation and vigilantism all around.  
It is not a principle for selecting generative compromise. 
C.  Tethered Generativity and Anonymous Appliancization 
Zittrain’s predicament is illustrated by his critique of “tethered 
appliancization.”215  He observes that devices like digital video record-
ers (“DVRs”) and cellphones are “tethered,” because they can be 
monitored from afar by a controlling interest, while devices like re-
frigerators and televisions are “appliances,” because they are locked 
down and closed to user modifications.216  Combining the terms, he 
refers to “tethered appliancization” as the capacity to lock down de-
vices from afar via remote command, allowing dangerous or subver-
sive uses to be disabled long after the point of sale.  Zittrain acknowl-
edges that the feature is attractive to many sellers and consumers 
because it offers reliability and safety.  Yet, he also worries that the 
trend toward tethered appliancization is anti-generative because it 
makes enforcement too easy, permitting regulators to stifle experi-
mental uses before those uses have a chance to prove their worth.217  
When enforcement is costly, regulators are forced to tolerate activities 
that are technically illegal but below a certain threshold of priority.218  
That leniency “allow[s] for experimentation of all sorts and later rein-
                                               
“draw directly upon . . . those who operate in good faith, to try to make the Internet a bet-
ter place”). 
 215.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 103. 
 216.  Id. at 106 (“Tethered appliances . . . are appliances in that they are easy to use, 
while not easy to tinker with [and] are tethered because it is easy for their vendors to change 
them from afar, long after the devices have left warehouses and showrooms.”). 
 217.  Id. at 103 (“With tethered appliances, the dangers of excess come . . . from the 
much more predictable interventions by regulators into the devices themselves, and in 
turn into the ways that people can use the appliances.”); id. at 112 (“Challenging the rise 
of tethered appliances helps maintain certain costs on the exercise of government pow-
er—costs that reduce the enforcement of objectionable laws.”); see also id. at 118 (“The rise 
of tethered appliances significantly reduces the number and variety of people and institu-
tions required to apply the state’s power on a mass scale.  It removes a practical check on 
the use of that power.”). 
 218.  Id. at 119 & n.84 (citing Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?, SLATE 
(Oct. 26, 2006, 4:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2152264) (describing the concept of 
“tolerated uses”). 
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ing in [of] excesses and abuses as they happen, rather than prevent-
ing them from the outset.”219  But as regulatory costs approach zero, 
regulators can achieve “perfect enforcement,” thereby eliminating the 
latitude to dissent and decide for oneself whether an activity is truly 
harmful.220 
The trouble with Zittrain’s critique of tethered appliancization is 
that it does not grapple with the middle ground between self en-
forcement and perfect enforcement.  Perfect enforcement is a legiti-
mate concern anytime there is a centralized system of detection and 
prevention; but Zittrain’s response is to fight the centralized en-
forcement model itself.  He does not offer guiding principles for how 
regulators might create barriers or stickiness so that a rule can be en-
forced with appropriate moderation. 
One helpful move is to distinguish tethering from applianciza-
tion.  Tethering can be understood mainly as a detection mechanism, 
i.e., an anonymity restriction.  The actual generative loss is inflicted by 
appliancization, which describes any modifications done to the device 
(before or after manufacture) to prevent future violative uses.  As 
James Grimmelmann and Paul Ohm have astutely observed, “tether-
ing and appliancization sometimes flow from common pressures, 
[but] one can exist without the other.”221  Thus, a proper critique of 
tethered appliances should include consideration of the interplay be-
tween anonymity and generativity.  For example, if tethering is less 
harmful to generative potential than appliancization is, then we can 
envision more palatable regulatory combinations in which tethering is 
                                               
 219.  Id.  The argument in favor of such leniency draws its strength from the distinction 
between malum prohibitum and malum in se, the notion that prohibition by law does not 
make an act inherently immoral or evil.  See Zittrain, Online Gatekeeping, supra note 117, at 
254–55. 
 220.  ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 122 (“Perfect enforcement collapses the public under-
standing of the law with its application, eliminating a useful interface between the law’s 
terms and its application.  Part of what makes us human are the choices that we make eve-
ry day about what counts as right and wrong, and whether to give in to temptations that we 
believe to be wrong.”); see generally Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to 
Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2008) (discussing the concerns 
of perfect enforcement raised by the use of technology to enforce law, including perfect 
prevention, perfect surveillance, and perfect correction). 
 221.  See Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note 7, at 938 (“Even with its auto-update tether, 
the PC is still profoundly more generative than the fully appliancized GPS unit. And yet, 
we suspect that Zittrain loses more sleep over the tethered PC than over appliancized GPS 
units.”). 
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paired with traditional legal remedies rather than with applianciza-
tion remedies. 
Of the two, appliancization is more troubling because it acts as a 
true prior restraint.222  Targeting the technology in lieu of the indi-
vidual makes regulation too facile—not in the quantitative sense that 
too many violations are prevented or corrected, but in the qualitative 
sense that it avoids the discomfort of having to grapple individually 
with each case.223  Consider the example of speeding.  If a city relies 
on technological means to artificially cap the maximum speed of cars 
driving within a designated zone, then that rule is absolute and can-
not be violated even for good cause.  By contrast, remedies that act 
directly on the individual, such as imposing a fine or revoking a driv-
er’s license, must survive repeated scrutiny because they can be con-
tested and evaluated each time they are applied.224  Recurrent review 
has uncovered societal unease even in areas as seemingly settled as 
narcotics,225 child pornography,226 and death penalty sentencing.227  
Appliancization short-circuits that iterative process.228 
                                               
 222.  Law-based “prior restraints” can be breached as long as one is willing to assume 
the risk of penalty, whereas technology-based restraints can be breached only if one has 
the ability and expertise to circumvent them.  Cf. Steven Alan Childress, The Empty Concept 
of Self-Censorship, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1969, 1972–73 (1996) (arguing that “the entire distinc-
tion between prior restraint and ex post facto punishment is a false one . . . because most 
systems identified as prior restraints actually achieve that goal merely by imposing costs on 
those who avoid the administrative scheme or fail to get a license”). 
 223.  Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1613, 1627–28 (1986) 
(arguing that awareness and consideration of death and pain must remain central to legal 
interpretation). 
 224.  See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 220, ¶¶ 14–15 (describing opposition to a Hawaiian 
initiative in 2000 to use cameras to ticket everyone driving six or more miles over the 
speed limit).  Similarly, opposition to the national speed limit led to its repeal in 1995.  
National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 205(d), 109 Stat. 
568, 577. 
 225.  The federal sentencing guidelines for cocaine-related offenses were amended in 
2010 to reduce the 100-to-1 disparity in crack cocaine sentencing compared with powder 
cocaine sentencing. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372; 
see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Supp. App. C amend. 706 (2007), available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2007_guidelines/Manual/appc2007.pdf.  Much of the 
evolving resistance to various sentencing guidelines may stem from common reservations 
regarding the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentencing laws. See Erik Luna & Paul G. 
Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 15 (2010) (comparing mandatory 
minimum sentences to a “tariff” on the least culpable criminals). 
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That is not to say that every instance of appliancization is prob-
lematic, provided that it is not being used to bypass due process con-
siderations.  A court may prohibit a specific individual from using 
computers or accessing the Internet if it determines that the individu-
al’s use of such technologies poses an unreasonable risk to public 
safety.229  Nor should we be disturbed by cases like TiVo, Inc. v. EchoS-
tar Communications Corp.,230 the leading example selected by Zittrain to 
demonstrate the problems of appliancization.231  There, EchoStar’s 
DVR devices were found to have infringed TiVo’s patents, and 
Zittrain’s concern was that the district court had ordered EchoStar to 
remotely deactivate infringing devices that were still in the physical 
                                               
 226.  Criminal sentences for possession of child pornography is another example where 
we have seen resistance develop over time, as judges have had to grapple repeatedly with 
the severity of the penalty.  See A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes on Child Pornography 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A1 (describing how judges around the country have be-
gun to criticize amendments to sentencing guidelines that nearly quadrupled the average 
prison sentence for individuals convicted of possessing child pornography); see also Arlen 
Specter & Linda Dale Hoffa, A Quiet but Growing Judicial Rebellion Against Harsh Sentences for 
Child Pornography Offenses—Should the Laws Be Changed?, CHAMPION, Oct. 2011, at 12 (ob-
serving that a 2010 survey of federal judges found that “70 percent of respondents said the 
possession ranges were too high, 69 percent said the same for receipt, and 30 percent said 
the ranges for distribution were excessive”). 
 227.  See, e.g., William Yardley, Oregon Governor Says He Will Not Allow Executions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at A14 (noting that only thirty-four states currently allow the death 
penalty and that only twenty-seven have performed executions in the past decade); see also 
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (declaring, fa-
mously, that “[f]rom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death”). 
 228.  See Mulligan, supra note 220, at  ¶ 102 (“The ability of individuals to disobey or 
refuse to enforce laws can provide lawmakers with the pressure and incentive to re-
evaluate the wisdom of laws.”). 
 229.  See United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Consensus is emerging 
among our sister circuits that Internet bans, while perhaps unreasonably broad for de-
fendants who possess or distribute child pornography, may be appropriate for those who 
use the Internet to ‘initiate or facilitate the victimization of children.’” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 230.  446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 231.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 103–04.  
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possession of customers.232  But the result was no different than if the 
district court had ordered EchoStar to cease broadcasting to those 
devices.  The only offender in question, EchoStar, was fully represent-
ed in court.  The injunction did not address any customers individual-
ly or direct them to destroy or surrender their devices; nor did it pro-
hibit customers from obtaining DVR service elsewhere.233  The conflict 
in TiVo was between horizontal competitors over a known and intend-
ed use, not between vertical entities threatening newly generative us-
es.234 
It is easy to point to tethering as the culprit that facilitates appli-
ancization.  After all, a controlling interest with direct access to a de-
vice can simply compel the results it wants on its own terms.235  We 
have seen Amazon spontaneously delete electronic copies of books 
from subscribers’ Kindles,236 while Apple regularly reprograms its de-
vices in order to thwart efforts to “jailbreak” them, even when jail-
breaking is not illegal.237  That power is not limited to proprietary 
hardware.  Sony BMG used “rootkit” software to disable customers’ 
computers from copying its CDs,238 and the creators of the Stuxnet 
                                               
 232.  See TiVo, 466 F. Supp. 2d. at 669–70 (“Defendants do not dispute that, with soft-
ware updates transmitted directly to the infringing products, the DVR capabilities of the 
infringing products can be disabled.”). 
 233.  Id. at 670 (stating that one reason for granting the injunction is that DVR custom-
ers are “sticky customers,” and that continued infringement would lead to long-term loss 
of market share). 
 234.  Id. (“The hardship of disabling DVR capabilities to Defendants’ DVR customers is 
a consequence of Defendants’ infringement and does not weigh against an injunction.”). 
 235.  See ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, 107–10 (discussing the ways in which “[t]hose who con-
trol the tethered appliance can control the behavior undertaken with the device,” includ-
ing reprogramming a device “after it is in consumer hands, to reflect changed circum-
stances”). 
 236.  Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle. (One Is ‘1984.’), N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 2009, at B1.  
 237.  Jailbreaking is a process by which an iPhone user can access hidden functionality 
that Apple has purposefully deactivated.  See Jenna Wortham, In Ruling on iPhones, Apple 
Loses a Bit of Its Grip, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at B3 (noting that the Library of Congress 
determined that an exception to the DMCA allowing for “the so-called jailbreaking of 
iPhones and other devices” was legally permissible); Dan Goodin, Apple Eyes Kill Switch for 
Jailbroken iPhones, REGISTER (Aug. 20, 2010, 10:38 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010 
/08/20/apple_jailbreak_patent/ (discussing Apple’s attempts to prevent jailbreaking). 
 238.  See Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED (Nov. 17, 2005), 
htpp://wired.com/politics/securitymatters/2005/11/69601?currentPage=all.  
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worm were able to seize hostile control of centrifuges at a key nuclear 
facility in Iran.239  In each of those cases, however, the objection is to 
the specific use of appliancization, not to the general fact of tether-
ing. 
Attempting to preserve generativity by severing connections with 
the networked environment is itself weirdly anti-generative.  In fact, 
tethering can promote generativity by encouraging under-polished 
“beta” products to be released early with the understanding that final 
touches can be added later.  That is the model by which open source 
software development has always operated, with the expectation that 
early developmental releases will be replaced regularly by newer, 
more stable releases.240  Tethering is also vital to applications like 
search engines and GPS devices, which depend on information sets 
that are regularly updated with new data.  More generally, cloud 
computing operates by providing devices at the ends of the network 
with continuous access to data and services in the middle of the net-
work.241  While cloud computing still faces important challenges, it is 
an extraordinarily innovative step made possible because of tethering, 
not in spite of it. 
Even if we were to set aside the affirmative benefits of tethering, 
however, there is another reason to endorse it.  Tethering provides a 
means of identification; without it, regulation would be conducted in-
stead through restrictions on functionality and access. 
To take an offline example, 9/11 created an enormous desire to 
protect airplanes from being used in another terrorist attack.  Yet, the 
inability to easily identify terrorists has resulted in overbroad re-
strictions on ordinary items permitted through security checkpoints—
liquids, scissors, aerosols, sporting equipment, snowglobes, and 
more.242  Those restrictions have been rightly called “security thea-
                                               
 239.  See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1 (discussing how President Obama authorized secret attacks on 
the computer systems that controlled Iran’s nuclear processing facilities); see also Gross, 
supra note 99. 
 240.  See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND 
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 28–33 (2000) (describing why “[e]arly 
and frequent releases are a critical part of the Linux development model”). 
 241.  See generally Michael Armbrust et al., A View of Cloud Computing, 53 COMM. ACM 50, 
50–55 (2010). 
 242.  See Prohibited Items, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-
information/prohibited-items (last updated Feb. 12, 2013).  Those restrictions were re-
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ter,”243 but they can also be viewed as the natural outgrowth of at-
tempting to achieve a desired regulatory outcome in the absence of a 
good identification system. 
A similar story can be told about border control.  The inability to 
easily distinguish illegal immigrants from legal residents has led to ef-
forts to restrict free movement across borders using checkpoints, 
fences, patrols, and citizen-manned surveillance cameras.244  Efforts to 
create better identification schemes have been protested as violations 
of civil liberties,245 yet we should at least be cognizant that enforce-
                                               
cently relaxed to allow pocketknives, golf clubs, and other sports items.  Jad Mouawad, U.S. 
Relaxes Air Travel Carry-On Prohibitions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2013, at B3. 
 243.  See, e.g., Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Infor-
mation Markets: A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 443 
(2008) (“The government’s pursuit of ‘Security Theater’ following September 11, 2001 
(‘9/11’) leverages anti-terrorism techniques that appear ‘high tech’ and effective, but in 
reality are highly flawed.”); Jeffrey Goldberg, The Things He Carried, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2008, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/the-things-he-carried 
/307057/ (“Airport security in America is a sham—‘security theater’ designed to make 
travelers feel better and catch stupid terrorists.  Smart ones can get through security with 
fake boarding passes and all manner of prohibited items—as our correspondent did with 
ease.”). 
 244.  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Some Cheer Border Fence as Others Ponder the Cost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2011, at A17 (reporting on proposals to expand the border fence that has been 
built along 650 miles of the border between the United States and Mexico); John Burnett, 
A New Way to Patrol the Texas Border: Virtually, NPR (Feb. 23, 2009, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101050132 (stating that over 
43,000 people have become “virtual Texas deputies” by logging on to www.blueservo.net 
and monitoring border cameras).  But see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–
10 (2012) (lifting the injunction on a provision of an Arizona statute that authorizes state 
officers to determine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest). 
 245.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185–89 (2008) (plu-
rality opinion) (rejecting a facial challenge to an Indiana statute requiring photo identifi-
cation to vote on election day); Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immi-
gration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1 (noting President Obama’s opposition to an 
Arizona immigration law that would criminalize the failure to carry immigration docu-
ments and give police the power to detain an individual suspected of being in the country 
illegally); Kim Zetter, No Real Debate for Real ID, WIRED (May 10, 2005), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/05/67471 (noting that hundreds of 
civil liberties groups oppose the Real ID Act, a piece of federal legislation that would estab-
lish a national identification card). 
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ment efforts are not being abandoned but are being shifted else-
where. 
The substitution effect also extends to software.  Because each 
copy of a software program is identical, any differentiation must be 
determined on the basis of extrinsic factors.  When that differentia-
tion can be performed by “calling home”—i.e., through a tethering 
mechanism—then verification is straightforward.246  Each customer 
can be issued a unique identifier, such as a username or license key, 
and any unauthorized use of that identifier can be readily investigated 
and remedied.247  Some spoofing and identity theft may occur, as it 
does offline, but the problem is relatively contained, as it is offline.  
On the other hand, when the software cannot rely on an external ver-
ification system, we can expect to see a corresponding push to devel-
op mechanisms to lock functionality, since each copy of the software 
must fend for itself.  Microsoft Windows, for example, generates a 
special hash code based on the specific hardware configuration of the 
computer, and it automatically disables itself if it detects that the un-
derlying hardware has changed—even if that switch was made by the 
rightful owner.248  Other software programs have been designed to be 
inoperable unless a physical object such as a CD-ROM or USB dongle 
is inserted into the computer.249  The dongle solution provides better 
portability but is subject to loss or theft. 
                                               
 246.  Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 101 (identifying “mobile phones, video game con-
soles, TiVos, iPods, and Blackberries” as tethered information appliances because they “as-
sure[] users that functionality and security improvements can be made as new problems 
are found”). 
 247.  See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(describing a dispute in which the plaintiff signed up for and paid to participate in a mul-
tiplayer role-playing game and the game administrators froze his account after he allegedly 
cheated); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2009) (ob-
serving that the companies that run virtual worlds can exercise technological control to 
suspend or ban players). 
 248.  See Technical Details on Microsoft Product Activation for Windows XP, MICROSOFT 
TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb457054.aspx (last updated Aug. 
13, 2001) (outlining Microsoft’s development of product activation to help reduce soft-
ware piracy). 
 249.  See, e.g., Noah J. Wald, Note, Don’t Circumvent My Dongle! Misinterpretation of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act Threatens Digital Security Technology, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 325, 
328–30 (2011) (“A dongle acts like a tangible key to a digital lock. . . .  High-end software 
purchases often include a dongle. Use of the software will require that the dongle plug 
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With the Internet, a choice to favor appliancization over tether-
ing would be especially puzzling because it fights against the natural 
orientation of the system.  On one hand, the Internet lends itself to 
always-on connectivity, especially as bandwidth improves and costs 
diminish.250  Assigning unique identifiers to computing devices, and 
ensuring that those identifiers remain reasonably fixed over time, 
would be trivial as a technological matter.  By contrast, the network 
protocols were designed to guarantee robust connectivity between any 
two arbitrary peer nodes.251  As a result, it is difficult if not impossible 
to impose functional or access restrictions on the Internet without vio-
lating that basic tenet.252  Taxes on email, the Great Firewall of China, 
deep-packet inspection for quality of service, takedowns of peer-to-
peer networks—each targets a different aspect of the ability to send 
data freely from one node to another.253   
As long as we treat tethering as inseparable from appliancization, 
we will see only a false dichotomy between a networked world and a 
generative world.  But once we see that a different choice can be 
made—anonymity versus generativity—then we should find tethering 
                                               
into the computer, most commonly through a USB port. . . .  [The software] will be useless 
without an authorized dongle capable of accessing the software.”). 
 250.  See BRIAN X. CHEN, ALWAYS ON: HOW THE IPHONE UNLOCKED THE ANYTHING-
ANYTIME-ANYWHERE FUTURE—AND LOCKED US IN 47 (2011) (“Just imagine the possibilities 
when the incredibly capable Internet-powered devices we carry in our pockets increase in 
power and decrease in price while cellular networks mature to handle massive amounts of 
data at blazingly fast speeds.”). 
 251.  See David D. Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, AGM 
SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 1988, at 106 (explaining that “since this network 
was designed to operate in a military context, which implied the possibility of a hostile en-
vironment, survivability was put as a first goal, and accountability as a last goal. . . .  An ar-
chitecture primarily for commercial deployment would clearly place these goals at the op-
posite end of the list.”). 
 252. ZITTRAIN, supra note 1, at 185 (noting that “new platforms of Web services . . . de-
pend on Internet connectivity to function”); see also id. at 123-24.  (“[T]he features that 
make tethered appliances worrisome—that they are less generative and that they can be so 
quickly and effectively regulated—apply with equal force to the software that migrates to 
become a service offered over the Internet.”). 
 253.  See, e.g., Richard Clayton et. al., Ignoring the Great Firewall of China 3 I/S J.L. & POL’Y 
INFO. SOC’Y 273, 274–78, 284–86 (2007) (describing “methods available to countries that 
wish to prevent their citizens from accessing particular Internet content,” which include 
content inspection and packet dropping schemes, as well as the Great Firewall, China’s 
Internet filtering system). 
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to be the lesser harm, because it works in consonance with the exist-
ing attributes of the network, rather than being at odds with the core 
function of the network. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For years, we have accepted as gospel the notion that nourishing 
the innovative potential of the Internet depends on minimizing re-
strictive controls over the network.  What we have seen instead is a 
game of whack-a-mole, where resistance to controls in one place only 
causes other controls to pop up elsewhere.254  Rather than resisting 
those controls reactively, wherever they appear, we should think more 
prudently about prioritizing the disorderly aspects of the Internet that 
matter most.  Zittrain has argued persuasively that generativity should 
top that list.255  But a list of priorities must offer more than one option 
to be practicable to regulators interested in achieving specific regula-
tory outcomes.  If we want regulators to leave generativity intact, we 
must lead them away with some other bait.  A willingness to embrace 
restrictions on online anonymity would provide that flexibility.256 
One place to begin is to embed network identification into the 
computer hardware, such as through the use of IPv6.257  The current 
Internet addressing system, IPv4, is transitioning to IPv6 because we 
are running out of IPv4 addresses.258  By providing a greatly expanded 
                                               
 254.  See supra Parts II–III. 
 255.  See supra Part III.B. 
 256.  See supra Part III. 
 257.  See David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
531, 532, 543 (2012), available at http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/ 
vol.-2_Clark-landau_Final-Version1.pdf (noting that “[n]etwork-level addresses (IP ad-
dresses) are more useful than is often thought as a starting point for attribution, in those 
cases where attribution is relevant,” since any form of personal-level attribution is ineffec-
tive when dealing with compromised computers). 
 258.  See Dylan Tweney, No Easy Fixes as Internet Runs Out of Addresses, WIRED (Feb. 3, 
2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/02/internet-addresses/ (“IP ad-
dresses are like telephone digits, in that there’s a finite number of them. . . . It’s as if every 
possible area code from 001 to 999 had already been utilized or reserved.”); see also Hollis, 
supra note 114, at 399 n.172 (describing the benefits and flaws of transitioning to IPv6); 
Terrence K. Kelly & Jeffrey Hunker, Cyber Policy: Institutional Struggle in a Transformed World, 
8 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 210, 238–41 (2012) (noting the policy challenges of transi-
tioning from IPv4 to IPv6, because IPv6 is not backward compatible with IPv4); IEEE-USA, 
NEXT GENERATION INTERNET: IPV4 ADDRESS EXHAUSTION, MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND 
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address space, IPv6 eliminates the need for dynamic addressing and 
shared addressing—two outgrowths of the current address shortage 
that have contributed greatly to hindering the reliable identification 
of Internet users.259  Dynamic addressing allows efficient recycling of a 
limited set of addresses by assigning addresses on a rolling basis as 
each device connects to the network, rather than assigning static ad-
dresses that never change.260  Shared addressing employs a different 
scheme that allows a single, assigned address to be used simultaneous-
ly by multiple users and devices.261  Both workarounds rely on main-
taining imprecise relationships between user devices and IP addresses.  
By contrast, using IPv6 to assign a unique and static IP address to each 
device would go a long way toward achieving device-level attribution. 
Under the device-ID model, at least three vulnerabilities would 
remain: (1) the potential inaccuracy of network activity logs (forget-
ting or mistaking an identity); (2) the use of intermediary devices to 
mask the originating IP address (concealing an identity); and (3) the 
spoofing of IP addresses (falsifying an identity).262  Those vulnerabili-
ties can be mitigated, though not eliminated.   
Of the three, the first presents the most difficult logistical chal-
lenge, because it requires numerous private parties to maintain mas-
sive data logs and protect them from unauthorized access or tamper-
                                               
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 9–11 (2009), available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/white 
papers/IEEEUSAWP-IPv62009.pdf. 
 259.  See Frederick Lah, Note, Are IP Addresses “Personally Identifiable Information”?, 4 I/S: 
J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 681, 699–704 (2008) (describing the debate over whether IP 
addresses are reliable enough at identifying individuals that they should be protected as 
personal data); IEEE-USA, supra note 258, at 9–11 (describing common methods of shar-
ing scarce IP addresses, including Network Address Translation (NAT), Classless Inter 
Domain Routing (CIDR), and dynamic IPv4 address assignment (DHCP)). 
 260.  IEEE-USA, supra note 258, at 11 (“One method of IPv4 address exhaustion mitiga-
tion is to allow different clients to share the same IP address at different times. . . .  When 
the client disconnects, the ISP puts the previously allocated IP address into a pool.”). 
 261.  See ICANN, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESSES 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/learning/beginners-guides/ip-addresses-
beginners-guide-04mar11-en.pdf (“If your computer is assigned a private address but you 
can still access services over the Internet, then your computer is probably behind a Net-
work Address Translator (NAT), which lets lots of computers share a single unique IP ad-
dress.”). 
 262.  See Hollis, supra note 114, at 399 n.172 (noting that “record-keeping, stepping 
stones, [and] botnets” will continue to create attribution problems even after a transition 
to IPv6). 
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ing.263  Enacting statutory recordkeeping duties would help,264 but er-
rors and security breaches would likely persist.  The second presents 
the most difficult technological and legal challenge, because it entails 
preventing or uprooting any proxy networks that assist—voluntarily or 
involuntarily—in passing around Internet traffic to “launder” it of 
identifying information.265  Above-the-board operations like Tor might 
be more easily dissuaded, but a determined criminal operation would 
use every means possible to protect itself.266  The third is the simplest 
to address, as it can be foiled mainly by performing server-side valida-
tion to verify that the packet’s stated origin matches its real origin.267  
Nevertheless, it still deserves mention because it can be exploited for 
distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) attacks.268 
Each of those vulnerabilities is compounded by the problem of 
international borders.  If a foreign government refuses to cooperate, 
it can obstruct identification efforts in each of the three ways de-
scribed above: (1) by withholding or failing to keep appropriate rec-
ords; (2) by allowing its network traffic to be scrubbed of identifying 
details; and (3) by improperly validating spoofed credentials.  A for-
                                               
 263.  See id. at 399 (“Attackers routinely destroy or modify system logs so victims lack in-
formation (or receive misinformation) on what happened.”). 
 264.  See supra note 160. 
 265.  See Clark & Landau, supra note 257, at 533 (“The most challenging and complex 
attacks to deter are those we call multi-stage attacks, where the attacker infiltrates one 
computer to use as a platform to attack a second, and so on.”); Hollis, supra note 114, at 
399 (“[A botnet] will install several ‘stepping stones’ between the attacking computer and 
the system used to control and command it.  In effect, attackers can ‘launder’ the packets 
so that the attack’s true origins will be difficult, if not impossible, to find.”). 
 266.  But see Roger Dingledine & Nick Mathewson, Anonymity Loves Company: Usability 
and the Network Effect, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE 
CAN USE 547, 549 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005) (explaining that 
“[n]o organization can build [an anonymizing network] for its own sole use,” because “any 
connections entering or leaving that network would be obviously linkable to the control-
ling organization”). 
 267.  See Clark & Landau, supra note 257, at 534–35 (explaining that “the source address 
found in [Internet data] packets often provides a valid form of source attribution,” even 
though it could potentially be forged or falsified by the sender, because “the source ad-
dress of the packet has to be valid for the reply to arrive back”). 
 268.  See id. at 556 (“[T]he only sort of attack where a forged IP address is effective is a 
DDoS attack, where the goal is just to flood the destination with useless traffic.  Any more 
sophisticated exchange, for example in support of espionage, will necessitate a two-way 
exchange of information; this requires the use of valid source addresses.”). 
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eign government could also obfuscate its own military activities269 or 
refuse to extradite identified criminals residing within its territory.270  
The challenge of international cooperation is a longstanding one, 
and unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, but one option would be to 
conduct an “Internet embargo” by establishing a cooperative network 
of Internet allies, and assigning tariffs or prohibiting all traffic from 
non-cooperating countries.271 
Another option is to deploy reliable validation at the application 
layer.272  Previous efforts such as digital signatures have been unsuc-
cessful,273 but two possibilities seem particularly promising.  The first is 
peer-based validation through social networks such as Facebook.274  
Ninety percent of the work toward peer-based validation has been 
done; the remaining ten percent requires finding a way to cull out the 
fake accounts without alienating the real ones.  The second possibility 
is government-based validation through an agency-issued credential.  
The U.S. Army already registers every soldier and provides online ac-
cess to military benefits and services.275  Digital management of civilian 
                                               
 269.  But see id. at 554 (noting that for national security issues, the degree of attribution 
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 270.  See id. at 552–53 (“[E]ven if we were to push for a variant of the Internet that de-
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to barriers that would arise from variation in jurisdictions.”). 
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 272.  See id. at 556–57 (arguing that an application-specific approach to attribution of-
fers a better tradeoff between accountability and freedom than a network-based ap-
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 273.  See Jane K. Winn, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signa-
tures and Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 358–59 (2001) (refuting claims that digi-
tal signatures are widely used, and arguing furthermore that usage is unlikely to increase 
in the near future, because “trying to use asymmetric cryptography as a signature on a con-
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 275.  See Louise Knapp, Army Intranet: World’s Largest, WIRED (Nov. 15, 2001), 
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benefit entitlements is the next logical step.  The challenge there is in 
finding appropriate ways to adapt a military solution to the civilian 
sector. 
Beyond the technological challenges, there is also a set of specific 
situations where identity-based measures are an ill-suited mode of 
regulation.  Some activities are so hazardous (such as nuclear tech-
nology) that we do not want to allow any form of public access, anon-
ymous or otherwise.  Other identity-based measures of regulation may 
not work for the following reasons: (1) the remedies may be nonex-
istent (because the laws are unwritten or unjust); (2) the remedies 
may be unenforceable (as with international crimes that cross juris-
dictional borders); (3) the remedies may be under-enforced (as with 
petty crimes that overextend our prosecutorial resources); or (4) the 
remedies may be non-factors (as with crimes of passion and acts of 
terrorism or war). 
Where the problems associated with identification are too intrac-
table, we should acknowledge the need for some generative compro-
mise, and return to preventive, appliancized solutions. The point is 
not to vilify anti-generative measures, or to exalt anti-anonymity 
measures.  Whatever balance we ultimately accept, we should recog-
nize that there is a choice to be made, and that the choice should re-
flect the exceptionalism we want the future Internet to have. 
                                               
comment-gary-winkler-army-ako-email.aspx (“AKO has become the Army’s ‘secret 
sauce.’ . . .  AKO provides identity, authentication and help-desk services for more than 
1,000 applications.”).  But see Joe Gould, GIs, Officials Disagree on Effectiveness of AKO, 
ARMYTIMES (Nov. 28, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/11/army-
soldiers-disagree-on-army-knowledge-online-112810w/ (reporting on frustrations with the 
system’s cumbersome authentication requirements). 
